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INTRODUCTION 
The topic of the present work thesis is diversification strategy. In particular the 
Portuguese context is studied, it proved to be breeding grounds for my studies. 
The interest of this research derived from the Erasmus experience that gave me 
the opportunity to know the companies analyzed, the Portuguese economic 
context and to collect all the data and information that the study required.  In this 
thesis an empirical analysis of two Portuguese companies is proposed: Sonae and 
Jeronimo Martins. These companies focus on the retail industry and through 
operations, such as acquisitions and partnerships, they have diversified their 
activities over the years. Nowadays Sonae and Jeronimo Martins are leaders of 
the Portuguese retail industry and they have reinforced their position. The aim of 
the study is to determine whether the number of acquisitions and partnerships 
concluded by the companies has influenced the number of stores that the two 
companies have opened in the years 1998-2013. To achieve this objective both a 
qualitative and a quantitative analysis will be conducted: in fact a descriptive 
analysis of company data from a historical viewpoint will be proposed, in this 
regard a time series of  data from 1998 to 2013 will be built for each company, 
and also an econometric analysis of time series data of the two case studies.  
The first part of the thesis is a comprehensive review of diversification strategy 
literature to better understand diversification strategy and the rest of the work. 
Starting from definitions of diversifications given by authors and the description 
of related and unrelated diversification, benefits and costs of diversification, and 
the theories of why firms diversify, the attention will be focalized on the 
relationship between diversification and performance. Literature review will be 
concluded with the link between resources and type of diversification. 
The second chapter focalizes on the diversification modes. The choice of entry 
mode is an important part of a firm’s new business development strategy. A 
diversifying entrant is concerned not only about what markets to enter, but also 
how to enter them. Firms typically enter new markets through internal 
development, a common alternative is to acquire a firm or business unit that is 
already established, a further alternative is to enter through alliances such as joint 
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ventures. In any given context, the three modes are likely to differ referring to the 
costs, risk, and speed of entry. In the chapter advantages and disadvantages of the 
three diversification methods will be specified. 
In the last part of the work the empirical analysis is made, it is organized on three 
“levels”: the first one is an introduction of the two companies, in which a 
company overview and a business units descriptions are present both for 
Jeronimo Martins and Sonae. The second “level” is a description analysis of 
company data, in this part there is a descriptive analysis of the data of the two 
companies from a historical viewpoint, in this regard a time series of  data from 
1998 to 2013 has been built for each company. Thus, analyzing operating and 
financial trends of companies in the last 16 years relevant information on the 
overall performance of the companies may be obtained, moreover a comparative 
analysis of the companies is provided. The third “level” is an econometric 
analysis, to achieve the objective of the study four econometric models are 
proposed. In these econometric models the dependent variable is the number of 
stores, while the key independent variables are the number of acquisitions and 
the number of partnerships. Furthermore also an economic-financial variable or a 
variable of business growth will be added to each model, in order to verify its 
influence to the dependent variable. Finally the conclusions of the study are 
presented. 
From a methodological point of view, the electronic databases of the library of 
Universidade de Coimbra, (B-on or Proquest and ABI-INFORM Global), the 
consolidated annual reports of Jeronimo Martins and Sonae, and the software 
“STATA Version 12” for processing the time series in the econometric analysis, 
were used.  
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CHAPTER 1.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1  Introduction 
Diversification has emerged as a central topic of research in strategic 
management. Studies of diversification have long been a pillar of strategic 
management research. However, this subject has been widely studied by 
economists (Berry, 1975; Gort 1962; Markham, 1973; Mueller, 1977), by  
scholars from other areas such as business historians (Chandler, 1962; 
Dridrichsen, 1972) and researchers in the areas of finance (Reid, 1968; Weston 
and Mansinghka, 1971), law (Davidson, 1981, 1985, 1986) and marketing 
(Levitt, 1975; Capon, Hulbert, Farley and Martin, 1988). As a topic of research, 
diversification has a rich tradition. From a managerial perspective, Ansoff was 
the first who discussed diversification strategy (Ansoff 1957, 1958) some years 
before the publication of Chandler’s (1962) or Gort’s (1962) works on 
diversification. The past two decades have seen extensive research on 
diversification strategy. Although diversification strategy has established itself as 
an academic discipline, its establishment has been a slow process because 
researchers in this area prefer to publish their best works in more established 
journals. Another major obstacle to the development of diversification strategy is 
that the subject has a high degree of interaction with other disciplines. Because of 
this overlap, its distinct theoretical model and analytical tools are unjustly 
attributed to other competing fields.  
Today, the literature on diversification covers a wide range of research questions 
and issues, and also a great variety of perspectives and disciplinary paradigms.  
The notions of diversification and diversity occupy a central place in the 
language and literature of strategic management fields, along with other concepts 
such as synergy (Ansoff, 1965; Carter, 1977; Chatterjee, 1986) distinctive 
competence (Hitt, Ireland and Palia, 1982; Selznick, 1957; Snow and Hrebiniak, 
1980), and generic strategies (Dess and Davis, 1984; Porter, 1980). In addition to 
an extensive body of literature on diversification as a topic in its own right, 
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diversity occurs prominently as a key variable in numerous studies focused on 
other aspects of strategic management as well reorganizations (Allen, 1979); 
foreign ventures (Bane and Neubauer, 1981); top management decision-making 
(Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983); managing diversity and interdependence (Lorsch 
and Allen, 1973); managerial determinants of organizational performance 
(Springate and Miller, 1978)
1
. The importance of this topic is even more clear 
observing the Table 1.1, it is a subject which has received the right attention for a 
long time, in fact since 1999 the most cited journals in diversification strategy 
area were all “top journals” such as Strategic Management Journal, Academy of 
Management Journal and Academy of Management review
2
 (see Table 1.1). 
 
TABLE 1.1 - THE MOST FREQUENTLY CITED JOURNALS: 1999-2008 
Journals Total citations 
Strategic Management Journal 6,171 
Academy of Management Journal 3,922 
Academy of Management Review 1,764 
Journal of International Business Studies 1,485 
Journal of Finance 1,457 
Administrative Science Quarterly 1,257 
Management Science 1,195 
Journal of Financial Economics 1,081 
Strategic Management  1,048 
Journal of Management 1,044 
Source -  Cheng-Hua Wang, & Yender McLee, & Jen-Hwa Kuo, (2011), “Diversification strategy: themes, concepts 
and relationships”, International Conference on Economics and Finance Research, Vol. 4, pp. 154-159 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review of diversification 
strategy literature to better understand diversification strategy and the rest of the 
thesis. This chapter deals with the most important diversification strategy’s 
                                                          
1
 Ramanujam, V., & Varadarajam, P., (1989), “Research on corporate diversification: a synthesis”, 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 523-551 
2
 Cheng-Hua Wang, & Yender McLee, & Jen-Hwa Kuo, (2011), “Diversification strategy: themes, concepts 
and relationships”, International Conference on Economics and Finance Research, Vol. 4, pp. 154-159 
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themes discussed by authors over the years and it is organized as follows. In the 
next paragraph I bring together a number of definitions of diversification, then I 
describe related and unrelated diversification, benefits and costs of 
diversification and the theories of why firms diversity, finally the relationships 
between diversification and performance, the link between resources and type of 
diversification conclude the chapter.  
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1.2  Definitions of diversification 
Corporate diversification is a phenomenon that has received considerable 
attention in the strategic management and industrial organization literature. The 
concept of diversification is yet to be clearly defined and there is no consensus 
on its precise definition among researchers. There are many definitions on 
diversification. The reason is that diversification strategy is a multidimensional 
phenomenon. It includes the goals of diversification, its direction, and the means 
by which it should be accomplished. Earlier definitions of diversification, such as 
Gort (1962) and Berry (1975), approached the subject from products or services 
across industry or market boundaries. Gort defined diversification in terms of the 
concept of “heterogeneity of output” based on the number of market served by 
the output. In his view two products are said to serve separate markets if their 
cross-elasticities of demand are low and if, in the short run, the necessary 
resources employed in the production and distribution of one cannot be shifted to 
the other. To Berry diversification represents an increase of the number of 
industries in which firms are active. Rumelt (1974) defined diversification 
strategy as a “firm’s commitment to diversity per se, together with the strengths, 
skills or purposes that span this diversity, shown by the way in which business 
activities are related one to another”. Kamien and Schwartz (1975) defined 
diversification as the extent to which firms classified in one industry produce 
goods classified in another. In all these early definitions, industry or market 
boundaries are assumed to be given. In contrast, Pitts and Hopkins (1982) use the 
word “business” rather than “industry”, defining diversification as the extent to 
which firms operate in different businesses simultaneously. “Business” 
definitions, in contrast to definition of “industry”, assume the perspective of the 
firm as opposed to an external analyst and allow for greater subjectivity in the 
measurement of diversification. Ansoff’s (1957, 1965) notion of diversification 
emphasizes the entry of firms into new markets with new products, his emphasis 
is on the diversification act rather than the state of diversity which characterizes 
the definitions mentioned earlier. Still more recent attempts at defining 
diversification have focused on the multidimensional nature of the diversification 
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phenomenon, for example the definition provided by Booz, Allen and Hamilton 
(1985). The authors defined diversification: 
“as a means of spreading the base of a business to achieve improved growth 
and/or reduce overall risk that (a) include all investments except those aimed 
directly supporting the competitiveness of existing business, (b) may take the 
form of investments that address new products, services or geographic markets; 
and (c) may be accomplished by different methods including internal 
development, acquisitions, joint ventures, licensing agreements, etc. “  
In general, diversification refers to a firm’s entry to a new market. It means 
increase in the types of business a firm operates.  
 
1.3  Related and unrelated diversification 
The strategy literature describes two types of diversification: related and 
unrelated. Related diversification involves operating businesses in industries that 
are related to each other and, therefore, offers opportunities to share operating 
assets and capabilities as well as financial resources. Unrelated diversification 
involves operating businesses in industries that are not related to each other and, 
consequently, presents opportunities to share financial resources and a relatively 
limited set of opportunities to share operating assets and capabilities (Jones and 
Hill 1988). Although related diversification offers the chance to share more 
resources, implementing related diversification also involves greater coordination 
and control (Jones and Hill 1988). 
Rumelt (1974) used four major and nine minor categories to characterize the 
diversification strategy of firms. The major categories were single business, 
dominant business, related business and unrelated business. The nine categories 
of diversification are given in Table 1.2. 
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TABLE 1.2 - RUMELT’S DIVERSIFICATION CATEGORIES 
1. Single business A firm with a specialization ratio of 95% or more. 
2. Dominant-
vertical 
Vertically integrated firms with a vertical ratio of 70% or 
more and no one of the products contribute more than 
95% of total revenue. 
3. Dominant-
constrained 
A firm that derives more than 70% but less than 95% of its 
revenues from its largest single business, and which 
diversified by building on a single strength or resource 
associated with its original business. 
4. Dominant-linked A firm that derives more than 70% but less than 95% of its 
revenues from its largest single business and diversified 
by building on the basis of several strength or resource 
which vary across the different businesses in the firm. 
5. Dominant-
unrelated 
A firm that derives more than 70% but less than 95% of its 
revenues from its largest single business and the 
remaining lines of business are unrelated to the dominant 
business or to each other. 
6. Related-
constrained 
A firm deriving less than 70% of its sales from a single 
business which diversified by building on a single strength 
or resource associated with the original business. 
7. Related-linked A firm deriving less that 70% of its business from a single 
business which diversified on the basis of several strength 
and resources with vary across different businesses in the 
firm. 
8. Unrelated-
acquisitive 
conglomerates 
A firm with a relatedness of less than 70% which had over 
the previous five years (1) an average growth rate in 
earning per share of at least 10% per year, (2) made at 
least five acquisitions, three into unrelated businesses, and 
(3) issued new equity shared. 
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9. Unrelated-passive A firm with a relatedness ratio of less than 70%, with did 
not meet the criteria for an unrelated-acquisitive 
conglomerate. 
Source – Rumelt, R. P., (1982), “Diversification strategy and profitability”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 3, pp. 
359-369 
 
These categories provide a spectrum of diversification strategy, from firms that 
remained essentially undiversified to firms which diversified significantly into 
unrelated areas. Rumelt was able to relate diversification strategy to 
performance. Rumelt’s study was based on a random sample of 246 firms, and 
several performance measures were used: sales growth, earnings growth, 
earnings per share, relative earnings deviation of earning per share, price earning 
ratio, return on equity, return on investment, and other. Although the results were 
not uniform across the various performance measures used, the related 
diversification strategies, related constrained and related linked, were found to 
outperform the other diversification strategies on the average. The related-
constrained was found to be the highest performing on the average. By contrast, 
the unrelated-conglomerate strategy was found to be one of the lowest 
performing  on the average. So, Rumelt classically distinguishes first between 
related and unrelated and second between related-constrained and related-linked 
diversification. Related diversified firms draw more than 30 percent of their 
turnover from businesses related in terms of technologies and markets. Within 
this broader category, Rumelt describes related-constrained diversifiers and as 
having tightly clustered relationships between all businesses in their portfolio and 
related-linked diversifiers as having a series of limited relationships between 
businesses. Of these, theory particularly favors related-constrained  
diversification (Rumelt,  1974; Palich et al., 2000). Firstly, related diversifiers are 
superior to unrelated diversifiers because of operational synergies in marketing 
and technology (Rumelt, 1974) and the transferability of knowledge across allied 
businesses (Teece, 1982). Secondly, related-constrained diversifiers have the 
advantage over  related-linked diversifiers because they are able to exploit 
synergistic and knowledge advantages over denser networks of internal 
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relationships (Rumelt, 1974). Hskisson and Johnson (1992) describe related-
linked diversification as a “between” form of diversification, lacking either the 
managerial simplicity of unrelated diversification or the focus advantages of 
related-constrained  diversification. 
 
1.4  Benefits of diversification 
There are both benefits and costs associated with corporate diversification. 
According to some theories, there are several potential benefits of operating 
different lines of business within one firm.  
First, operating in more that one industry can enable a firm to grow to take 
advantage of economies of scale and scope. Chandler (1977) proposes that 
diversification can create gains to diversified firms from managerial economies 
of scale. Teece (1980) points out that diversified firms can enjoy economies of 
scope.  
Second, diversification leads to more efficient allocations of resources. The 
efficient capital market argument typically suggests that diversified firms have 
more access to internally generated resources and can exploit superior 
information to allocate resources among divisions (Williamson, 1967). Weston 
(1970) suggests that managers possess monitoring and information advantages 
over external capital markets. Diversification leads to a more efficient allocation 
of resources across businesses in diversified firms because these firms create a 
larger internal capital markets through diversification. Having an internal market 
to fund the firm’s needs for capital offers a number of possible sources of value 
to the firm’s owners (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). Internally raised equity capital is 
less costly than funds raised in the external capital markets. The firm avoids the 
transaction costs associated with sales of securities to the public, as well as the 
costs of  overcoming information asymmetry problems encountered when selling 
securities in the capital market. With an internal source of financing, the firm’s 
managers can exercise superior decision control over project selection, rather 
than leaving the firm’s investment decisions to the whims of less-well informed 
investor in the external market. Furthermore, Stulz (1990) shows that larger 
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internal capital markets help diversified firms reduce the under investment 
problem described by Myers (1977). Stein (1997) argues that the winner picking 
ability of headquarters may allow internal capital markets in diversified firms to 
work more efficiently than external capital markets.  
Third, diversification is associated with tax benefits, and increased debt capacity 
due to reduced bankruptcy probabilities (Lewellen, 1971). Lewellen (1971) 
argues that the coinsurance effect, which arises from operating businesses with 
imperfectly correlated earning streams, gives diversified firms greater debt 
capacity than single-line businesses of similar size. One way in which increased 
debt capacity creates value is by increasing interest tax shields. A further tax 
advantage arises from the tax code’s asymmetric treatment of gains and losses. 
Majd and Myers (1987) note that undiversified firms are at significant tax 
disadvantage because tax is paid to the government when income is positive, but 
the government does not pay the firms when income is negative.  Berger and 
Ofek (1995) note that multi-segment firms can immediately realize tax saving by 
offsetting losses in some segments against profits in others. 
Fourth, diversification leads to increase market power. Bernheim and Winston 
(1990) argue that corporate diversification can increase the firm’s market power 
as a result of mutual forbearance between multi-market competitors. Tirole 
(1995) posits that corporate diversification can increase the firm’s market power 
because of cross subsidized predatory pricing. 
Fifth, diversification allows the firms to seek businesses that are good matches 
for their capabilities. Matsusaka (2001) posits that diversification can be a value-
maximizing strategy because firms are composed of organizational capabilities 
that can be profitable in multiple businesses and because diversification is a 
search process by which firms seek businesses that are good matches for their 
capabilities.      
Sixth, diversification can improve informativeness of the firm’s returns as a 
signal of the manager’s effort. Aron (1988) argues that diversification is valuable 
because of the potential benefits of improved information that reduces the cost of 
agency contracting. She examines a specific model in which diversification into 
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additional lines of business generates new signals whose noise is independent of 
the other signals’ and which has no effect on the distribution of the other signals. 
For this independent return case, she shows that diversification reduces the costs 
incurred by the principal to induce the agent to undertake effort.  
Finally, corporate diversification may create shareholder value by mitigating 
failures in product, labour, and financial markets (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). 
From a resource-based perspective further benefits of diversification include the 
ability to exploit excess firm specific assets and share resources such as brand 
names, managerial skills, consumer loyalty and technological innovations.  
 
1.5  Costs of diversification 
Researchers have also developed theories about why diversification may be 
value-destroying. Diversifying activities of a firm can also be associated with 
potential disadvantages.  
First, diversification may create inefficient internal capital markets. The internal 
capital markets in fact may operate less efficiently than the external markets. 
Stulz (1990) argues that this occurs when headquarters overinvests in poorly 
performing divisions out of a sense of fairness or to preserve lines of business 
that should be terminated. Similarly, informational asymmetries between the 
divisions and headquarters can lead to a suboptimal allocation of resources 
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1997). Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) suggest that 
the cross subsidization of failing business segments in diversified firms allows 
poor segments to drain resources from better-performing segments. 
Second, diversification creates agency costs. Agency theory suggests that 
diversified firms have lower value because diversification serves as a means 
through which managers can pursue their owner interests at the expense of 
shareholders. Managers may diversity their company to advance their personal 
position rather than to maximize firm value. Specifically, diversification may 
allow managers to: increase their compensation, power and prestige (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990); reduce their personal risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981); or become 
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entrenched by directing diversification in a way consistent with their own skills 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
Finally, diversification is associated with information asymmetry costs. Harris, 
Kriebel and Raviv (1982) propose that the information asymmetry costs that arise 
between central management and divisional managers are higher in diversified 
firms than in focused firms to the extent information is more dispersed within the 
firm. 
 
1.6  Why do firms diversify? 
Many arguments have been made about why firms diversify. Montgomery (1994) 
identifies three main theoretical perspectives that can be used to explain why a 
firm might choose to diversify: agency theory, the resource based view, and 
market power
3
. Two of these, the market power view and the resource view, are 
consistent with profit maximization, but only the latter is consistent with the 
efficient use of resources. The other, the agency view, is managerial in nature, 
and is consistent with neither profit maximization nor efficiency.  
Market power theory: diversified firms act in many markets and produce many 
products so their market power increases. By having market power, they can 
stabilize their position and use predatory pricing to improve their profitability. 
This view argues that diversified firms will “thrive at the expense of non-
diversified firms not because they are any more efficient, but because they have 
access to what is termed conglomerate power” (Hill, 1985). The first that 
expounded this approach was Corwin Edwards (1955) in “Conglomerate bigness 
as a source of market power”: 
“A concern that produces many products and operates across many markets need 
not regard a particular market as a separate unit for determining business policy 
and need not attempt to maximize its profits in the sale of each of its products, as 
has been presupposed in our traditional scheme… It may possess power in a 
particular market not only by virtue of its place in the organization of that 
                                                          
3
 Montgomery, C. A., (1994), “Corporate diversification”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8, 
Number  3, pp. 163-178 
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market but also by virtue of the scope and character of its activities elsewhere. It 
may be able to exploit, extend, or defend its power by tactics other than those 
that are traditionally associated with the idea of monopoly.” 
Economists following Edwards offer three different anti-competitive motives for 
diversification. The first is cross-subsidization, a firm uses the profits generated 
in one industry (sometimes known as “deep pockets”) to support predatory 
pricing in another. The second is mutual forbearance, where firms meeting each 
others in multiple markets and recognize their interdependence and compete less 
vigorously (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). The third is reciprocal buying, firms 
might use corporate diversification to engage in reciprocal buying with other 
large firms in order to foreclose markets to smaller competitors. Gribbin (1976) 
argues that conglomerate power is a function of the firm’s market power in its 
individual markets. So, a firm with insignificant position in a number of markets 
will not have conglomerate power.  
The agency theory: diversification results from the pursuit of managerial self-
interest at the expense of stockholders. Berle and Means cautioned against the 
separation of the owners (principals) and the managers (agents). Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1988) explain: “When managers hold little equity in the firm and 
shareholders are too dispersed to enforce value maximization, corporate assets 
may be deployed to benefit managers rather than shareholders”. Arguments 
which link diversification and firm growth are typically related to the life cycle 
of the firm. In fact, young and growing businesses have plenty of profitable 
opportunities in which to reinvest earning. However, as businesses mature, these 
opportunities become scarce and managers begin to use cash flows from earlier 
innovative efforts to pursue increasingly far-flung opportunities (Mueller, 1972). 
This is the theory of “free cash flow”, the theory is explained by Jensen (1986): 
“Acquisitions are one way managers spend cash instead of paying it out to 
shareholders. Therefore, the free cash flow theory implies managers of firms with 
unused borrowing power and large free cash flow are more likely to undertake 
low benefit or even value destroying mergers. Diversification programs 
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generally fit this category, and the theory predicts they will generate lower total 
gains.” 
In spite of the potential costs associated with diversification, as mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, managers may seek to diversity because it is expected to (a) 
increase their compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) power, and prestige 
(Jensen, 1986); (b) make their positions with the firm more secure by making 
investments that require their particular skills (Shkeifer and Vishny, 1989); (c) 
reduce the risk of their personal investment  portfolio by reducing firm risk since 
the managers cannot reduce their own risk by diversifying their portfolios 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981). So the market power view of diversification 
emphasizes the benefits that a firm may collect at the expense of its competitors 
and customers, while the agency view emphasizes the benefits that a firm’s 
managers may collect at the expense of its shareholders. As a result, the agency 
view would predict a negative relationship between diversification and firm 
value. 
The resource based theory: many economists were familiar with the market 
power theory and the agency theory, in contrast fewer considered the resource 
based theory. Edith Penrose (1959) developed the resource based theory. 
According to this perspective, firms may choose to diversity because they 
possess excess capacity in resources and capabilities that are transferable across 
industries. These include factors that firms has purchased in the market, services 
that firm has created from those factors, and special knowledge that firm has 
accumulated through time. For example, the firm may use the same marketing 
and distribution channel to market a variety of goods or services. The firm may 
also be able to utilize its corporate legal and financial staffs to support a variety 
of different industries. Penrose used the word “resource” more narrowly, to refer 
only to the “physical things a company buys, leases, or produces for its own use, 
and the people hired on terms that make them effectively part of the firm”.  
According to Penrose (1959) there are three main obstacles for the attainment of 
the equilibrium position: “those arising from the familiar difficulties posed by 
indivisibility of resources; those arising from the fact that the same resources 
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can be used differently under different circumstances, and in particular, in a 
specialized manner; and those arising because in the ordinary processes of 
operation and expansion new productive services are continually being created”. 
In this view, so long as expansion provides a way of more profitably employing 
its underused resources, a firm has an incentive to expand. Teece (1980) argues 
that if a firm’s unused resources can be efficiently sold in the market, the 
rationale for diversification evaporates. According to the resource-based theory a 
firm’s level of profit and breadth of diversification are a function of its resource 
stock. Resources of firms differ in specificity, more specific resources may only 
be applied in a small number of industries, but may yield higher  marginal returns 
due to their specificity. In contrast less specific factors may transfer further and 
provide the basis for a widely diversified firm, but support lower rent because 
they are in wider supply. Firms are different and they will have different optimal 
levels of diversification. For  a firm with less specific resources, profit may be 
maximized at a relatively high level of diversification even though a firm with 
more specific resources could obtain absolutely higher profits with less 
diversification
4
. 
 
1.7  Diversification and performance 
The relationship between corporate diversification and firm performance has 
been the subject of a great deal of research, both in the fields of strategy and 
finance. In fact, the diversification-performance linkage has been explored by 
many researchers from different disciplines, such as economics, finance or 
strategic management. Despite these numerous researches done on the subject, 
the results of the studies are inconclusive and sometimes contradictory. This lack 
of consensus is usually attributed both to the diversity of theoretical views and to 
methodological reasons (use of different samples, time periods, databases, 
econometric techniques). Research on the relationship between corporate 
diversification and firm value has evolved rapidly over the last years. Initially, 
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 Montgomery, C. A., (1994), “Corporate diversification”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8, 
Number 3, pp. 163-178 
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research by Lang and Stulz (1994), Comment and Jarrell (1995) Berger and Ofek 
(1995), and others showed that diversified firms trade at a significant discount 
relative to focused firms operating in the same industries. Speculation as to the 
source of this discount focused primarily on inefficient internal capital markets 
and other agency problems. So a number of studies have found that 
diversification has a strong negative effect on the value of the firm. More 
recently, the existence of this diversification discount has come into question. In 
contrast, a growing stream of literature provides evidences in support of the 
diversification premium. Empirically, some authors showed that,  controlling for 
a firm’s propensity to diversify, a small diversification premium exists. 
Theoretically, other authors showed that, in some circumstances, diversification 
can be a valuing maximizing choice, even if, overall, diversified firms have a 
lower value of focused firms. Thus, there is no consensus on whether corporate 
diversification destroys value or whether it is the optimal business strategy, 
which depends on the specific firm’s characteristic and time. 
 
1.7.1  Theoretical models: the linear model, the inverted-u model, the 
intermediate model 
However, beginning with Gort (1962), industrial organization economics 
spawned decades of research based on the premise that diversification and 
performance are linearly and positively related. This position rests upon several 
assumptions, including those derived from market power theory and internal 
marked efficiency arguments, among others. Diversified firms, as already said, 
can employ a number of mechanisms to create and exploit market power 
advantages, tools that are largely unavailable to their more focused counterparts. 
Taken together all the market power arguments imply that diversification is 
positively associated with performance (see figure 1.1). 
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 FIGURE 1.1 - THE LINEAR MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source - Palich, L. E., & Cardinal, L. B., & Miller, C. C., (2000), “Curvilinearity in the diversification-performance 
linkage: an examination of over three decades of research”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 21, pp 155- 174 
 
A single business firms has no access to investment from cross-subsidization, so 
its basic sources of capital are external, through debt and equity, which are more 
costly than internal generated funds, when are efficiently managed. The 
diversified firm has much greater flexibility in capital formation since it can 
access external sources as well as internally generated sources. That is, the 
diversified firm can attract external funding for expansion, but it can also shift 
capital, and other critical resources, between businesses within its portfolio. 
Thus, diversification can generate efficiencies that are unavailable to the single 
business firm. In addition to the flexibility in capital markets that diversification 
provides, the head offices of diversified firm should be better positioned to 
optimized the allocation of these resources because it has superior access to  
information that do external markets. Other advantages may accompany 
diversification, for example assets that cannot be sold due to transaction costs 
and other imperfections. Diversification may permit the firm to exploit these 
resources that would otherwise prove non-performing. Still, tax and financial 
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benefits and all the other benefits already discussed previously. Based on these 
arguments a linear model is suggested by some authors, where diversification 
and performance are linearly and positively related. Some authors conclude that 
empirical evidence suggests the costs of high levels of diversification overweigh 
the benefits, that focused firms outperform their more diversified counterparts. 
However these findings are not universal across studies. These inconsistencies 
have led to research using alternative models, particularly those that are 
curvilinear in orientation. These models recognizes that increasing diversification 
may not be associated with concomitant increases in performance and two 
alternatives have studied in the literature, the Inverted-U Model and the 
Intermediate Model.  
The Inverted-U Model: limited diversification represents a strategy of restricted 
business where the firm focuses on a single industry. Lubatkin and Chatterjee 
observe that single business firms do not have the opportunity to exploit between 
unit synergies or the portfolio effects that are available only to moderately and 
highly diversified firms. That is, focused enterprises do not have multiple 
businesses, so they do not enjoy scope economies. The authors also indicate that 
these firms bear greater risk since they have not “diversified away” that risk by 
combining less than perfectly correlated financial streams from multiple 
businesses. This has negative implications for the debt capacity, cost of capital 
and market performance of single business entities. In contrast to limited 
diversification, related diversification yields advantages to the firms. Theoretical 
rationales suggesting the superiority of related diversification have proliferated, 
but perhaps the most common of these focuses on advantages derived from 
economies of scope. Since they are related in some way, units are able to share 
resources and enjoy revenues from a positive brand reputation. Beyond the 
economies of scope that derive from activity sharing, related firms may also 
benefit from learning curve efficiencies, intrafirm product/process technology 
diffusion. While benefits accrue to diversification, at some point these efforts are 
also associated with major costs, for example control and effort losses, 
coordination costs and other diseconomies related to organization, inefficiencies 
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from conflicting “dominant logics” between businesses, and internal capital 
market inefficiencies. So the marginal costs of diversification increase rapidly as 
diversification hits high levels. Thus, one could easily conclude that firms 
experience some optimal level of diversification, with performance decrements 
to either side of that point maximization. Taken together, these and other 
arguments form the platform for the notion that related diversification is superior 
to that which is unrelated or conglomerate in nature. Combining these arguments 
with those supporting related diversification’s superiority over limited 
diversification, an inverted-U relationship is suggested for diversification and 
firm performance (see figure 1.2).  
 
 FIGURE 1.2 - THE INVERTED-U MODEL  
Single Related Unrelated 
PERFORMANCE 
DIVERSIFICATION 
Source - Palich, L. E., & Cardinal, L. B., & Miller, C. C., (2000), “Curvilinearity in the diversification-performance 
linkage: an examination of over three decades of research”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 21, pp 155- 174 
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The Intermediate Model: few authors have doubted the superiority of related 
diversification over limited diversification. While, the relative performance 
contribution of related versus unrelated diversification is often debated. 
According to this model, related and unrelated diversification are more or less 
equal in their impact on performance. In fact, related firms may not be able to 
exploit fully the relatedness designed into their portfolio of businesses. Some 
authors called this “exaggerated relatedness”, suggesting a “mirage effect” when 
assessing apparent similarities between business units. Related diversifies will 
outperform their unrelated counterparts if they are able to exploit relatedness to  
create new strategic assets more cheaply than competitors, so amortizing existing 
assets via economies of scope will yield short-term benefits at best. Nayyar 
(1992) argues that to exploit relatedness the costs partially decrease the benefits 
of that strategy. For example, the benefits of relatedness require a significant 
degree of cooperation among involved business units. From a transaction costs 
perspective, this cannot be achieved without intrafirm exchanges, which lead to 
inefficiencies resulting from governance costs (arising from coordination and 
integration demands), and bureaucratic distortions. The author also mentions  
impediments to relatedness exploitation: lack of communication between units, 
problems allocating joint costs, incompatible technologies and lack of the 
necessary cooperation among managers which lead to incentive distortions 
generated from this intrafirm competition. Unrelated strategies may present some 
unique advantages derived primarily from financial synergies. For example the 
reduction of the industry specific risk since unrelated diversification involves 
business units in multiple industries. Furthermore, the lower risk and reduced 
probabilities of  bankruptcy can also lead to increased debt capacity. So given the 
impediments to fully exploiting relatedness and the unique benefits that derive 
from unrelated diversification, the Intermediate Model may be an alternative to 
the Inverted-U Model (see figure 1.3). 
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 FIGURE 1.3 – THE INTERMEDIATE MODEL
Singh and Montgomery (1987) conclude that related operation should outperform 
unrelated operation. However, this perspective does not take into consideration 
the impediments to relatedness or the advantages that accrue only to unrelated 
firms. Thus, it is difficult to come to a definitive conclusion regarding the 
performance superiority of one strategy or the other. Questions regarding 
diversification performance linkage persist.  
 
1.7.2  Empirical evidence consistent and inconsistent with a diversification 
discount 
While theories provide no clear prediction on the overall effect of corporate 
diversification on firm value, empirical studies have attempted to show how 
diversification may affect firm value in the real word. Lang and Stulz (1994), 
using Tobin’s q as a performance measure, show that highly diversified firms 
have significantly lower average and median q values than single-segment firms. 
Thus, the authors interpret their findings as evidence that diversified firms are 
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Source - Palich, L. E., & Cardinal, L. B., & Miller, C. C., (2000), “Curvilinearity in the diversification-performance 
linkage: an examination of over three decades of research”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 21, pp 155- 174 
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consistently valued less than specialized firms. Berger and Ofek (1995) recognize 
the inappropriateness of using Tobin’s q in assessing the valuation effect of 
diversification and they estimate the effect of diversification on firm value by 
imputing stand-alone values for individual business segments. Comparing the 
sum of these stand-alone values to the firm’s actual value, they find that 
diversified firms experience a 13% to 15% average value loss relative to their 
specialized industry counterparts during 1986-1991. An additional source of loss 
in value is cross-subsidization of poorly performing divisions by better 
performing divisions.  
There are also studies that have questioned the evidence connecting 
conglomerate diversification to the destruction of shareholder value. Some 
studies challenge the existence of a diversification discount. According to these 
studies diversification discount is a consequence of measurement errors. 
Villalonga (2000) suggests that previous studies to estimate the valuation effect 
of diversification are wrong because they rely on reported business segment data. 
There are three problems inherent in these data. First, the extent of 
disaggregation in segment financial reporting is less than the true extent of firm 
diversification such that firms are actually more diversified than is indicated in 
segment financial reporting. This is because of the fact that segment reporting 
requires only those segments, which constitute 10% or more of sales, assets, 
profits be reported. The second problem with segment data is that the definition 
of a business segment is so flexible as to allow firms to combine two or more 
activities that are vertically or otherwise related into a single segment. The third 
problem with segment data is that some industries are fundamentally composed 
of segments of diversified firms. Instead of questioning the existence of a  
diversification discount, some other studies argue that the discount is attributable 
to factors other than diversification. In other words, it is not diversification but 
something else that causes the value loss of diversified firms. In this view one 
popular argument is that the discount is not due to diversification but is a result 
of diversified firms trading at a discount prior to diversifying. Lang and Stulz 
(1994) find that diversifying firms are poor performers prior to conglomeration. 
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Hyland and Diltz (2002) report that conglomerate firms perform poorly and 
adopt a diversification strategy in an effort to acquire growth opportunities.  
As can be seen, the result of studies is contradictory. Some researchers found 
there is no relationship between diversification and performance, while others 
argued that focused firms outperform than diversified firms. Additionally, some 
scholars found there is a positive relationship between related diversification and 
performance, however some studies show that firm can get profitable by doing 
unrelated diversification strategy. Some authors found the existence of a 
diversification discount and others of a diversification premium. The other 
interesting relationship between diversification and performance is that some 
researchers explored linear and curvilinear relationships. As a result, it seems that 
the studies for association diversification and firm performance are inconclusive 
and scholars should pay more attention to the conditions and environment in  
which other studies were done as well as the method and formula which the 
previous research applied.  
 
1.8  The link between resources and type of diversification 
A fundamental choice is the type of market that a firm chooses to enter. Once a 
firm decides to diversify, the type of market chosen for entry should be such that 
it provides the firm with a competitive advantage. Porter (1987) suggests that a 
firm can gain such competitive advantages if it has skills or resources that it can 
transfer into the new market. His suggestion is not new. Resources have long 
been recognized to be one of the key factors in explaining diversification. Rumelt 
(1974) talks about “core skills” which can be used in related markets. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) and Burt (1983) view multimarket operations of diversified 
firms as a means of managing resource-dependent relationships. The empirical 
evidence also suggests an association between diversification and the 
diversifying firm’s resource position. At the aggregate industry level some 
authors find that firms tend to diversify into industries which use resources 
similar to their own. Studies by Lecraw (1984) and Montgomery (1990) 
corroborate this at the individual level. All these studies suggest there is a 
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systematic relationship between the type of market a firm chooses to enter and its 
resource profile. The type of diversification that we would expect to result from a 
resource depends on its specificity within a particular industry. Clearly if a 
resource can be used to produce only one product, it is not suitable for 
diversification. However, most resources can be used for more than one end-
product. This characteristic of the resources is the flexibility. It is possible to 
consider three classes of resources: physical resources, intangible assets, and 
financial resources. The first two are fairly inflexible, therefore, they can be used 
only to enter closely related market. Financial resources, being most flexible, are 
useful for any type of diversification. Definitely, physical and intangible assets 
would lead to more related diversification, while financial resources can lead to 
any type of diversification
5
. To complete the argument we need to consider the 
extent to which different resources can be leveraged. Some resources, such as 
physical and financial resources, can be used only to the point where they are 
physically exhausted. So the only excess capacity available for diversified 
expansion is the stock beyond the requirements of the current businesses. By 
contrast some intangible resources such as brand names can be repeatedly used 
with different products with little cost in the effectiveness of original operations. 
These intangible assets usually accrue to a firm over time, and reside in the 
human capital of the firm in the form of knowledge and expertise.  
Physical resources. 
Physical resources of a firm, such as plant and equipment, are characterized by 
fixed capacity. Also, they are usually useful in a few very similar industries 
(inflexible). So if excess physical capacity motivates diversification, it would be 
in industries closely related to those in which the capacity is being used. Firms 
which have excess capacity of such resources are unlikely to use it for 
diversification far from their core business. 
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Intangible assets. 
Intangible assets include brand names or innovative capability. A brand name 
can be applied to several products with little or no adverse effects on existing 
applications. Similarly, a strong marketing team or innovative research 
department can successfully market or innovate new products in many different 
markets without affecting the original businesses. Intangible assets are also 
inflexible and, therefore, can be used to most advantage in related industries. 
This expectation has also been suggested by some authors, for example Bettis 
(1981) suggests that related firms perform better because these intangible assets 
“open up the possibility for differentiation and segmentation” and achieve high 
performance “by early entry into related industries susceptible to entry barriers 
and then exploiting a core skill to erect such barriers”6. Taken together these 
studies suggest the hypothesis that intangible assets are used to enter related 
markets where they are most likely to generate a competitive advantage.  
Financial resources. 
Financial resources in general are the most flexible of all resources because they 
can be used to buy all other type of productive resources. We can consider two 
classes of resources. The first class, internal funds, consists of liquidity at hand 
and unused debt capacity to borrow at normal rates. The second class, external 
funds, consist in new equity and possibly high risk debts. Several theories 
suggest that lower levels of internal funds (relative to external funds) will lead to 
lower levels of unrelated diversification and vice-versa. Since unrelated 
diversification is thought to be risky by the capital markets, external funds will 
not generally be available for unrelated projects. In other words, if agency 
behavior is widespread we would expect firms with low leverage pursuing 
unrelated diversification. Ultimately, relatively more unrelated diversification 
will be associated with internal funds and relatively more related diversification 
will be associated with external funds. So, availability of internal funds or unused 
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debt capacity will favor more unrelated diversification, while availability of 
equity capital will favor more related diversification, as can be seen in figure 1.4. 
 
FIGURE 1.4 – THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FLEXIBILITY OF 
RESOURCES AND THE TYPE OF MARKET 
 
 
 
 
                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The theoretical arguments are summarized in the graphic. It shows the 
relationship between resources (physical resources, intangible assets, financial 
resources) and the type of diversification (related and unrelated).  
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Source - Chatterjee, S., & Wernerfelt, B., (1991), “The link between resources and type of diversification: 
theory and evidence”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, Number 1, pp. 33-48 
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CHAPTER 2.  DIVERSIFICATION MODES 
 
2.1  Introduction 
A fundamental element of any firm’s corporate strategy is its choice of the 
businesses in which to compete. Diversification is one of the strategic decisions a 
firm uses in order to improve its portfolio and many studies have examined 
corporate diversification, as already seen in the chapter 1. 
The diversification decision is part of the larger growth decision of a firm, and 
one of the two growth decision available to the firm (see figure 2.1)
7
. 
 
FIGURE 2.1 - METHODS OF FIRM GROWTH                       
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Source - Simmonds, P. G., (1990), “The combined diversification breadth and mode dimensions and of large 
diversified firms”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 11, pp 399-410 
 
Firms pursue growth because of the benefits normally associated with size. The 
most logical growth strategy for any firm is undiversified growth. This is due to 
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the familiarity with product-market and growth strategy is faster than an attempt 
to pursue diversified growth, areas in which the firm is less astute. The decision 
on whether the internal or external mode should be used with undiversified 
growth is dependent on factors such as the amount of firm resources available 
and the speed with which growth is required, among others. However, a firm 
may be prohibited from undiversified expansion for a number of reasons, such as 
anti-trust consideration, market position and other market forces. The firm must  
then decide on expansion into other businesses, if firm expansion is critical to the 
long term survival of the firm. If a firm decided to diversify, it must make a 
choice of either related or unrelated diversification. A concurrent decision is 
whether such diversification will be implemented through internal or external 
means. The choice of entry mode is an important part of a firm’s new business 
development strategy. A diversifying entrant is concerned not only about what 
markets to enter, but also how to enter them. Thus, multibusiness corporations 
can use two pure diversification strategies: internal diversification, relying on 
development of new products or services, or external diversification, relying on 
the acquisition of other firms. Although firms could also pursue mixed 
diversification strategies, combining these two modes. As firms typically enter 
new markets organically through internal development, a common alternative is 
to acquire a firm or business unit that is already established, a further alternative 
is to enter through alliances such as joint ventures. In any given context, the three 
modes are likely to differ referring to the costs, risk, and speed of entry.  
Ultimately, diversification strategy can be implemented in different ways: 
internal development, acquisition, merger, joint venture, strategic alliance. Each 
diversification mode has advantages and disadvantages, so before choosing it is 
necessary to carefully evaluate the different alternatives on the basis of need 
which requires the competitive situation. The success of entry may depend upon 
the choice of diversification modes. 
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2.2  Acquisitions 
Grouping acquisitions has been done with similar criteria but in a different way. 
Some authors classified them into three distinctive categories: financial 
acquisitions, strategic acquisitions and diversification/conglomeration 
acquisitions. The motivation behind financial acquisitions is to improve a 
company’s inefficiency in financial performance. The strategic acquisitions 
involve two or more capabilities of the companies and make them get more 
synergistic. The motivation behind strategic acquisitions includes horizontal or 
vertical integration. Horizontal integration aims to achieve economies of scale 
with lower costs structures by consolidating companies in the same business 
arena. On the other hand, vertical integration targeted to improve strategic or 
operational efficiency by internalizing externalities such as transaction cost 
between firms along the value chain. Another author classified the acquisitions 
using the terminology of vertical, horizontal and conglomerate in order to avoid 
the less clear terminology of strategic acquisitions. The horizontal acquisitions 
include acquisition of companies in the same kind of business area in an attempt 
to achieve economies of scale. Many chemical companies followed this type of 
acquisitions because of their maturity of businesses and overcapacity. This 
attempt tries to achieve and regain market control by eliminating the extra 
capacity but in many countries such attempts are subject to government 
regulatory rules aimed at preventing a monopolistic environment. The vertical 
acquisitions occur between companies in different phases of business operation 
along the business’s value chain. The strategic goal of this type of acquisitions is 
to improve its business operation such as transaction cost, reduction of 
uncertainty between suppliers and buyers, and business performance 
improvement. The conglomerate acquisitions occur between  companies with 
unrelated business domains. This conglomerate acquisition provides three 
different reason for acquisitions: financial conglomerates, managerial 
conglomerates and concentric conglomerates. The financial conglomerate 
provides financial benefits but has nothing to do with the company’s other 
business operations. Investment companies may play a similar role to that of 
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conglomerate acquisitions but the conglomerate acquisitions are different in that 
they exert a managerial control over the acquired companies as opposed to the 
simple financial investment. This control may be maximized through managerial 
conglomerate because managerial support is transferred between the firms. The 
level of overlapping of management functions defines whether it is a concentric 
conglomerate or not. The significance of overlapping of management in R&D, 
operation, manufacturing and finance will increase the transfer of management 
capabilities between the firms involved.  
 
2.2.1  Advantages and disadvantages 
The acquisition is often considered the easiest way to diversify, since 
theoretically, allows the company to obtain immediately the set of resources 
required to achieve a competitive advantage in an industry. However, as it 
happens for every diversification mode, also the acquisition has both advantages 
and disadvantages, so the opportunity to adopt this solution must be evaluated 
every time depending on the circumstances. 
Advantages: 
 Speed: one of the main advantages of the acquisition is represented by the 
capacity to enter a new business in an immediate way. Acquiring a 
company already operating, in fact, you will not need to spend time and 
energy to obtain a position within the market, neither to develop the 
necessary resources. This may be a significant advantage when the 
necessary resources are difficult to reproduce or accumulate. So, 
acquisition provides ability to speedily acquire resources and competences 
that you do not have. 
 Overcome entry barrier: it overcomes market entry barrier by acquiring an 
existing organization. The risk of competitive reaction decreases. 
 Elimination of potential competitors: the acquisition of an existing 
company also eliminates a potential competitor from the market. In this 
way competition decreases.  
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 Other benefits: revenue growth opportunities, cost saving opportunities, 
may enable economies of scale, access to complementary activities. 
Disadvantages: 
 High cost: one of the most important disadvantages of acquisition is that it 
may be a very expensive way to enter a new sector. In fact, to conclude a 
transaction of this kind there might be premiums more than 30% of the 
market price of the shares. The best acquirer may be either a company that 
has a lot of confidential information about the value of the business to be 
acquired or a company that thanks to the acquisition might create value in 
a consistent way and therefore it is willing to pay a high price. 
 Integration problems: the activities of new and old organizations may be 
difficult to integrate and there might be resistances from employees. Still, 
incompatibility of management styles, structures and culture. 
 Additional activities not required: in most cases the acquisition possesses   
a number of activities, but only some of them really interest the acquirer. 
The management of unnecessary activities and maintaining them is often 
source of significant costs, both in terms of money and time. 
 Other disadvantages: the operation requires a great commitment, high 
failure rate, diseconomies of scale. 
 
2.2.2  Post acquisition integration 
Among the causes of acquisition failure, there are also the difficulties that may 
be encountered in the process of post-acquisition integration. Haspeslagh and 
Jemison (1991) have stated that the approach a company should take towards 
integration should be understood by considering two criteria: the need for 
strategic interdependence and the need for organizational autonomy. Regarding 
to the strategic interdependence, obviously the goal and central task in any 
acquisition is to create the value that is available when the two organizations are 
combined. There are four types of value creation:  
 Resource sharing: value is created by combining the companies at the 
operating level; 
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 Functional skills transfer: value is created by moving people or sharing 
information, knowledge and know-how; 
 General management skill transfer: value is created through improved 
insight, coordination or control; 
 Combination benefits: value is created by leveraging cash resources, 
borrowing capacity, added purchasing power or greater market power. 
With regard to the organizational autonomy, managers must not grant autonomy 
too quickly, obviously people are important and should be treated fairly and with 
dignity. The need for organizational autonomy can be answered using three 
questions: 
 Is autonomy essential to preserve the strategic capability we bought? 
 If so, how much autonomy should be allowed? 
 In which areas specifically is autonomy important? 
The authors  combined these two dimensions to create their contingency matrix 
(see figure 2.2). 
 
FIGURE 2.2 – ACQUISITION INTEGRATION APPROACHES 
  
                        
  
   
                    
 
  
   
                                 
                    
                     
                                           
Source – Collis, D. J., & Montgomery, C. A., & Invernizzi, G., & Molteni M., (2012), “Corporate level strategy: 
generare valore condiviso nelle imprese multibusiness”, 3
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This matrix suggests there are four post-acquisition distinct styles based upon the 
need (or lack of it) to create value through the sharing and transfer of resources 
(strategic interdependence) and the need (or lack of it) to maintain the 
independence of the acquired company (autonomy). The four styles have been 
classified: 
 “Holding” (low autonomy, low strategic interdependence); 
 “Symbiotic” (high autonomy, high strategic interdependence); 
 “Preservation” (high autonomy, low strategic interdependence); 
 “Absorption” (low autonomy, high strategic interdependence); 
The easiest type of integration to manage is the “absorption”, in which the 
acquirer includes the company within the structures that he has. It is a hypothesis 
that occurs when a large buyer, already operating in a sector, acquires a smaller 
competitor. When the aim of acquisition is the diversification, one of the method 
used for the integration is the “preservation”; in this case is left high 
independence to the company acquired. Although it is an integration easy to be 
implemented from the operational point of view, the problem is to determine how 
value is added to the acquisition. The authors believe that this solution is 
particularly useful to improve the resources of a company, for example in the 
case of an acquirer who intends to derive new knowledge by the acquired 
company. In the event that the buyer intends to provide his own resources to the 
acquired company, or vice versa, this is called “symbiotic”; in this case the two 
companies are integrated to form a new entity. Obviously this integration mode is 
the most difficult to implement, in fact a number of acquisitions fail for this 
reason
8
.  
 
2.3  Strategic alliances 
The inter-firm alliances can be basically categorized as two types of 
arrangements: contractual agreements and equity arrangements (see figure 2.3). 
The contractual agreements that do not involve any transaction of equity of firms 
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include licensing and non-licensing as traditional contracts and joint R&D, joint 
manufacturing, joint marketing and research consortia as non-traditional 
contracts. On the other side, equity arrangement types of alliances can be 
classified in three distinctive ways, depending on whether they engage creation 
of new entities, dissolution of an existing entity, or creation of no new entity. 
Alliances such as joint ventures, merger and acquisitions usually involve some 
transaction of equity of the firms. As a result, these types of alliances are 
generally considered more complex, so assessment and evaluation in line with 
synergies, financial evaluation, organizational structure become critical issues to 
investigate in detail.  
 
FIGURE 2.3 – TYPES OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES   
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The term “strategic alliance” has been used in a slightly confusing way, some 
authors suggest necessary and sufficient characteristic of strategic alliances as 
follows: 
1. The two or more firms that unite to pursue a set of agreed upon goals 
remain independent subsequent to the formation of the alliance. 
2. The partner firms share the benefits of the alliance and control over the 
performance of assigned tasks, perhaps the most distinctive characteristic 
of alliances and the one that make them so difficult to manage. 
3. The partner firms contribute on a continuing basis in one or more key 
strategic areas, technology, products, and so on.  
In light of these criteria of strategic alliances, the authors argue that the licensing 
and franchising agreements are not a strategic alliances, they classify them as a 
tactical alliance because they do not involve any continuous transfer of 
technology, products, and skills between partners.  
 
2.3.1  Advantages and disadvantages 
Any type of alliance, equity or not equity, enjoys the benefits of the acquisition 
and internal development (see paragraph 2.4), but it avoids their disadvantages. If 
it is true that in many cases the alliances bring the desired results, it is equally 
true that in other cases have a number of disadvantages.  
Advantages:    
 Organizational advantages: sharing skills (distribution, marketing, 
management), brands, market knowledge, technical know-how and assets 
leads to synergistic effects, whose result is a set of resources which is 
more valuable than the separated single resources in the specific company. 
Strategic partner may also help you to increase your productive capacity, 
provide a distribution system, or extend your supply chain. Your strategic 
partner may provide goods or services that complements  goods or 
services you provide, so creating a synergy.  
 Economic advantages: you can reduce costs and risks by distributing them 
across the member of the alliance. You can also obtain greater economies 
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of scale in an alliance, as production volume can increase, causing the cost 
per unit to decline. 
 Strategic advantages: you may join with your rivals to cooperate instead to 
compete. You can also create alliances to create vertical integration where 
you partners are part of your supply chain. Strategic alliance may also be 
useful to create a competitive advantage by the pooling resources and 
skills. It may also be used to get access to new technologies. You can 
enter new market in an immediate way (speed). 
 Political advantages: sometimes you need to form a strategic alliance with 
a local foreign business to gain entry into a foreign market either because 
of local prejudices or legal barriers to entry.  
Disadvantages: 
 Coordination difficulties: these difficulties due to informal cooperation 
settings and highly costly dispute resolution.  
 Creating a competitor: the partner in a strategic alliance might become a 
competitor one day, if it profited enough from the alliance and grew 
enough to end the partnership and then is able to operate on its own in the 
same market segment. 
 Sharing: in a strategic alliance partners must share resources and profits 
and often skills and know-how. This can be critical if business secrets are 
included in this knowledge. Agreements can protect these secrets but the 
partner might not be willing to stick to such an agreements.  
 Risk of losing control over proprietary information, especially regarding 
complex transactions requiring extensive coordination and intensive 
information sharing. 
 Uneven alliances: when the decision powers are distributed very uneven, 
the weaker partner might be forced to act according to the will of the more 
powerful partners even if it is actually not willing to do so. 
 Opportunity costs: a strategic alliances might discourage from taking other 
opportunities, which might be beneficial as well. 
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2.4  Internal development 
Many companies who want to exploit their own resources in an incremental way, 
use internal development as expansion mode. Also in this case there are 
advantages and disadvantages. 
Advantages: 
 The main advantage of internal development is that it can be the easiest 
way to transfer some of the intangible assets to a new business.  
 Experience and knowledge are accumulated through this development, so 
over the time this know-how can be an important resource which can steer 
the company towards a new expansion.  
 Internal development allows an incremental decision-making process that 
reconciles the learning process that takes places within the company with 
the constant changes in environmental conditions.  
 The overall risk associated with internal development tends to be lower 
than risk associated with acquisition for some reasons. Internal 
development takes place through incremental investments that are spread 
across multiple transactions in a project whereas acquisition typically 
involves a lump-sum commitment through a single transaction. Therefore 
the losses associated with a failed acquisition are likely greater than those 
associated with a terminated internal development project.  
 The management wants to create and make the best use of resources, it 
can favorite the emergence of an entrepreneurial culture.  
Disadvantages: 
Some of the disadvantages of the internal development are the opposite of those 
that are the benefits of the acquisition. 
 
 Internal development is a process that necessarily requires a long period of 
time, in fact the company needs to develop resources that previously  
didn’t have. A decade or more is often required to fine-tune the business 
to achieve the profitability of established competitors. 
 Increase of the competitiveness of the business. 
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 The results might not match initial expectations. In the case of acquisition 
it is possible to remedy a disadvantage by reselling the company acquired, 
in the case of internal development is rather difficult to regain the 
investment made in a failed project.  
 
2.5  Relationship between types of diversification and the mode of 
diversification 
Different views persist concerning the form of relationships between types of 
diversification and the mode of diversification. For example, one school of 
thought believes that the type of diversification and the mode of entry are directly 
related. If a firm chooses a related strategy, then internal development should be 
favored because acquisitions rarely bring long-term advantages, and because the 
firm’s current strengths can be extended through internal development, thereby 
producing economic rents. Alternately, when a firm chooses an unrelated 
strategy, external development should be favored because the firm needs to 
acquire the skills to compete in the unrelated industry
9
. This school of thought 
points out how mode and strategy decisions reinforce each other. Related 
strategies require cooperation between units, and, therefore, firms adopting 
related strategies use control system based on cooperation. Internal development 
complements this requirement of related-constrained strategies. Unrelated 
strategies, though, require a different type of control system. These strategies 
emphasize competition for capital between units, and require financial types of 
controls. Additionally, cooperation between unit in an unrelated strategy may add 
transactions costs to the cooperating unit, putting these units at a disadvantage 
when facing competitors unhindered by similar corporate requirements. In effect, 
then, the presence of conflict is inconsistent with the requirements of related 
strategy, while cooperation is inconsistent with the requirements of an unrelated 
strategy. Therefore, internal development as a mode of entry should complement 
the use of related-constrained strategies, while acquisitions as a mode of entry 
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should complement the use of unrelated strategies. An alternative set of 
arguments, however, suggests that strategy and mode decisions do not display the 
expected links. These arguments fall into three general categories. First, 
responsibility for strategy decisions and mode decisions becomes subdivided in 
corporations. As the firm increases in size or diversify, middle managers take on 
an enhanced role in influencing and directing strategies. As different middle 
managers play a role in mode decisions, inconsistencies may be found between 
strategy and mode decisions. Second, strategy is a porous concept. Rarely is a 
firm entirely “related” or “unrelated”. As the related diversification efforts of a 
firm become less constrained, the imperative for internal development becomes 
less compelling. Indeed, a firm whose corporate strategy is related-linked might 
be simultaneously engaged in internal development at the core of its portfolio 
and acquisition at the portfolio’s periphery. Finally, acquisitions and internal 
innovation may provide variant alternatives for organizational learning. Firms 
use both modes of entry for learning purposes, regardless of strategy type. 
The assertion that multiple paths may be taken to each form of diversification 
does not imply that all paths result in the same performance. Certain 
combinations of strategy and mode should outperform other combinations. For 
related constrained strategies, internal development frequently offers 
performance advantages because internal development provides the necessary 
conditions for integration. Moreover, related-constrained diversifiers face 
substantive disadvantages in the acquisitions market. Acquisitions of large or 
successful firms may be viewed with skepticism by regulatory bodies. Even in 
permissive environments, competitors may bring suit to hinder or halt the 
acquisition. For these firms, internal development often proves optimal because 
acquisitions rarely succeed
10
. Different arguments can be offered for related-
linked strategies. Internal development might be favored for tightly linked 
subsets within the corporation, while acquisition might be favored for loosely 
linked portions of the corporate portfolio. Related-linked diversifiers would not 
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face the same problems in the acquisitions market as related-constrained 
diversifiers, because related-linked diversifiers could search several acquisitions 
markets, and each acquisition would be less likely to interest regulators. Under 
the assumption that opportunities for internal development and acquisition are 
distributed equally, the probability that a mixed approach would be optimal 
increases with diversity. A mixed mode, therefore, should provide the best 
performance for a related-linked diversifier. In the final instance, unrelated 
strategies, a third set of arguments apply. If internal development is scale 
dependent (if there are scale economies in R&D), development units within the 
unrelated firm are disadvantaged because development is shared across several 
differentiated units and products. The focused developer has scale advantages 
over the developer who spreads effort over a variety of products. Internal 
development, therefore, is unattractive for the unrelated diversifier. Ultimately, 
optimal performance patterns vary by strategy type: 
 Internal development provides the best performance for related-
constrained firms; 
 Mixed mode development provides the best performance for related-
linked firms; 
 Development via acquisition provides the best performance for unrelated 
firms
11
. 
 
2.5.1  The combined diversification breadth, diversification mode and 
performance 
A two by two matrix provide a four-cell representation of the combined elements 
(see figure 2.4). If an effective performance ranking of the four joint strategies 
could be established it would provide researchers with another tool for 
understanding and implementing diversification strategies
12
.  
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FIGURE 2.4 – RANKINGS OF THE COMBINED DIVERSIFICATION BREADTH 
AND DIVERSIFICATION MODES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source - Simmonds, P. G., (1990), “The combined diversification breadth and mode dimensions and of 
large diversified firms”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 11, pp 399-410 
 
Related-internal firms should be the highest performers. Cooperation and 
interaction between business units in technical, marketing, and production 
activities, combined with cohesive cultural patterns and administrative systems, 
should provide the best potential for synergy. Conversely, unrelated-external 
firms should be the lowest performers. The theoretical arguments generally favor 
the relatedness of businesses over unrelatedness, and the internal mode over the 
external mode, except in some special circumstances. The two cells, related-
internal and unrelated-external, are ranked first and fourth in performance, 
respectively. The related-external and unrelated-internal strategies are more 
difficult to rank. Each combines a theoretical advantage and disadvantage. 
However, it is highly unlikely that many firms will pursue an unrelated-internal 
strategy, due to the lack of experience and know-how. Only in situations where a 
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new and distinct industry/market has been created, such as a new product 
resulting from new technology, is the unrelated-internal strategy likely. Since no 
theoretical justification can be made for the superiority of either combination, 
they are equally ranked. 
 
2.5.2  Familiarity matrix 
Other authors suggested a familiarity matrix that shows different entry strategies 
depending on the company’s level of familiarity in various markets and 
technologies. This matrix consists of three distinctive regions: a base/familiar 
segment, a familiar/unfamiliar segment, and an interim segment
13
 (see figure 
2.5). 
FIGURE 2.5 – FAMILIARITY MATRIX  
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The base/familiar including region G, region D and region H is the place where 
internal development, acquisition, or licensing is a potential good entering 
strategy. Given the internal resources to develop a technology, product and 
market the company best’s option is to do it alone or sometimes execute an 
acquisition of companies in the same business arena along an industry value 
chain. For region H, on top of the options of internal development and 
acquisition, a licensing agreement may be and additional feasible option. 
Because the company has adequate market intelligence with existing products 
and services, it can expand its offering by bringing in the external resources 
through licensing contract. In region D where the technology is base but the 
market is in new/familiar region, the company can try an acquisition or joint 
venture besides the internal development option. In this case, the acquisition may 
be conducted in order to get market intelligence through the company acquired. 
In the case of joint venture, the potential partner may be a player that has a strong 
market presence, the first company with technology wishes to capitalize on. 
However, much attention should be paid to protecting technology assets during 
the relationship because often after the partner gests accustomed to the 
technology resources, the probability is that they will have controlling power 
over the relationship. The interim region including region A, region E and region 
I is the place where either technology or market is base but the other component 
is a new or unfamiliar region or both technology and market are in new or 
familiar region. This is one of typical situations where a complementary alliance 
is reasonable. Either of the partners is offering market channels or technology 
capabilities, and the company providing market access is likely to be a larger 
corporation and a small start-up may offer technological assets. In the region 
where both the market and technology are a new or familiar segment, an internal 
venture may be a good choice. The option in this region is likely to migrate to a 
base/familiar region after quickly acquiring familiarity technology and market. 
Managing a joint venture, however, creates a set of challenges in terms of 
strategy, governance, economics and organization. The probability is that the 
parent companies have a different set of reporting systems, processes, and 
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metrics so the difference may hamper the decision-making process and 
interaction between the joint venture and parent companies. Another potential 
issue to arise is strategy misalignment. If the parent company has different 
strategic goals as opposed to those of the joint venture, this environment will 
affect the performance of alliance in a negative manner. The lowest familiar 
region consists of region B, region C and region F. In this region of low 
familiarity, the feasible strategy to take may be a venture capital investment or 
acquisitions. Because of the high risk in entering new business with inadequate 
information, using two-step approaches is proposed. The first step should be 
build familiarity with the technology or market through venture capital 
investment or educational acquisitions. Once the company achieves the first goal, 
then it is in a situation to decide whether to invest more resources or not. 
Educational acquisition of small start-up provides an alternative means of 
acquiring the necessary familiarity with which it can pursue a large-scale 
acquisition decision.  
 
2.6  The effects of firm characteristics and industrial characteristics on 
diversification modes 
 As described earlier, firms have the option of expanding through the acquisition 
of an existing company, through establishing a completely new entity, or by 
joining another company. However, whether firms will diversify through 
acquisitions, joint ventures or startups also depends on firm characteristics, such 
as nationality, size, experience, and type of industry (manufacturing or service). 
The effects of firm characteristic on diversification modes have been investigated 
by many studies. Therefore, among the characteristics that have been explained 
are firm nationality, size and experience. 
Firm nationality.  
This characteristic has been claimed to be one of the major factors affecting 
firm’s decision in diversification behavior. Evidence of this has been suggested 
by a number of authors. Wilson (1980) shows that there were significantly 
different patterns of acquisitions among American, British and Japanese 
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corporations. His study shows that British and U.S. firms preferred acquisitions. 
Kogut and Singh’s (1988) study also shows that firm nationality was one of the 
key factors affecting firm decisions on diversification modes. Their study shows 
that Japanese firms used joint ventures more than acquisitions and start-ups. 
Acquisition was not a common type of diversification mode for Japanese firms. 
On the other hand, the authors study shows that British firms were very active in 
acquisitions. Their study suggested that the selection of diversification mode was 
influenced by cultural factors. Japanese firms were more aware of risks, so they 
were more likely to choose joint ventures rather than acquisitions. While British 
firms were more willing to bear risk, so they were more likely to choose 
acquisitions rather than joint ventures.  
Firm size.  
It is another important internal factor that that shapes behaviors and decisions. 
Obviously, the larger the investing firms, the greater the ability to acquire. 
Because acquisitions generally required more financial and managerial resources 
than joint ventures, size of the foreign firm’s assets should be positively 
correlated with the tendency to acquire. Conversely, acquisitions are 
discouraged, the larger the assets of the firm’s partner, target firm, or investment 
size. Dubin (1975) investigate the determinants of foreign acquisitions by 
American firms over the period 1948 to 1967. His study shows that the tendency 
to acquire fell with the size of the firm to be acquired. Caves and Mehra (1986) 
analyzed 138 decisions of non-American firms to enter the United States by 
Greenfield versus acquisition through a qualitative choice model. Among several 
independent variables, their study found that size of the foreign firm significantly 
influences the decision to acquire. The study by Kogut and Singh (1988) also 
shows that the firm’s size significantly affected the choices of diversification. 
They found that the larger the size of the American partner, the more likely it is 
to joint venture rather than acquire an existing firm. Shan and Hamilton (1991) 
presented empirical evidence that the firm-specific assets of small and large firms 
differ and that small firms are more likely to cooperate than large firms. 
Mansumirtchai, LeMaster and Minor (1999) investigated diversification modes 
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of U. S. and Japanese firms. Using firm size as an independent variable and three 
diversification modes as dependent variables, their study shows that in general 
firm’s size affected the firm’s diversification modes. The study shows that large 
sized-firms diversified more that small-sized firms for both U.S. and Japanese 
samples. In acquisition and start-up modes, they found significant differences in 
diversification transactions between large-sized and small-sized firms in 
Japanese sample.  
Firm experience.  
Many studies have examined whether firm experience affects the firm’s 
diversification modes. The theoretical explanation for a positive relationship 
between experience and selection of diversification modes centers on uncertainty 
and how firms cope with it. Less experienced firms perceive considerate 
uncertainty and overstate risks, and they are likely to join or team up with 
partners. On the other hand, with increasing experience, firms acquire knowledge 
of foreign markets, perceive less uncertainty, and become more confident of their 
ability to correctly estimate risks and returns and manage foreign operations. 
Thus, highly experienced firms are likely to choose acquisitions or start-ups 
rather than joint ventures. Davidson (1982) suggested that firms will more likely 
to invest where they have invested before. Dubin (1975) investigated the 
determinants of foreign acquisitions by American firms over the period of 1948 
to 1967. His findings suggest an increasing use of acquisitions as the firm 
acquires more experience in foreign markets. Erramilli (1991) examined the 
effect of international experience on service firm’s selection of foreign markets 
and entry modes. In general, his study indicated that the experience factors 
played an important role in the foreign market entry behavior of service firms.  
Industry characteristics. 
In addition to firm characteristics also industry characteristics may affect firm’s  
diversification modes, as we said at the beginning of the paragraph. Kogut and 
Singh’s study (1988) indicate a clear difference in industry patterns among the 
modes of entry. Their study shows that joint ventures are relatively more frequent 
in pharmaceutical/chemicals and electrical and non-electrical machinery. 
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Acquisitions occur primarily in natural resources, financial services and 
miscellaneous manufacturing industries. Chemical and electrical machinery are 
especially attractive industry for greenfield investments.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
52 
 
CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDIES  
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
In this chapter an empirical analysis of two Portuguese companies will be 
proposed: Sonae and Jeronimo Martins. These companies focus on the retail 
sector and through operations, such as acquisitions and partnerships, they have 
diversified their activities over the years. Nowadays Sonae and Jeronimo Martins 
are leaders of the Portuguese retail sector and they have reinforced their position. 
In the first part of the chapter a brief reference to the Portuguese macroeconomic 
context is present and then to the retail industry in general with particular 
reference to its main peculiarities. Subsequently there is a description of the 
Portuguese retail industry. Finally the analysis of the case studies is organized on 
three “levels”: the first one is an introduction of the two companies, in which a 
company overview and a business units descriptions are present both for 
Jeronimo Martins and Sonae. The second “level” is a description analysis of 
company data, in this part there is a descriptive analysis of the data of the two 
companies from a historical viewpoint, in this regard a time series of  data from 
1998 to 2013 has been built for each company. Thus, analyzing operating and 
financial trends of companies in the last 16 years relevant information on the 
overall performance of the companies may be obtained, moreover a comparative 
analysis of the companies is present. The third “level” of analysis is an 
econometric analysis, the aim of the study is to determine whether the number of 
acquisitions and partnerships concluded by the companies has influenced the 
number of stores that the two companies have opened in the years 1998-2013. In 
this regard four econometric models are proposed. In these econometric models 
the dependent variable is the number of stores, while the key independent 
variables are the number of acquisitions and the number of partnerships. 
Furthermore also an economic-financial variable or a variable of business growth 
will be added to each model, in order to verify its influence to the dependent 
variable. Finally the conclusions of the study are presented. 
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3.2  Portugal macroeconomic analysis 
The actual economic situation in Portugal is a consequence of accumulated 
budget deficits and very low growth rates during the last decade. Portugal has 
been following EU up and down tendencies concerning GDP growth however 
showing a much lower growth than the average of its country (see figure 3.1).  
 
                         FIGURE 3.1 – GDP GROWTH 2006-2017 
 
                                  Source: IMF World Economic Outlook 
 
During the year of 2009, Portugal followed EU in its recession period as a 
consequence of the global sovereign debt crisis that was aggravated by internal 
management measures that led the country to its weak competitive capacity. 
Since 2007 that its public debt has been suffering major increases due to the 
excessive spending of money in public works. In only 5 years it has gone from 
63.7% to more than 110% of the country’s GDP (see figure 3.2).  
 
FIGURE 3.2 – PORTUGAL’S NET DEBT AND INVESTMENT 
 
 
Source – IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2013 
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Furthermore, Portugal suffered from increasing pressure in financial markets as it 
watched main rating agencies downgrading its sovereign debt ratings to 
speculative grade. In fact the main rating agencies, S&P, Moody’s and Finch see 
Portugal as a speculative economy and have a negative outlook on its future. 
Consequently, as investors perceived Portugal as a riskier country its ability to 
finance through the markets decreased, increasing its difficulties to comply with 
its external obligations (for example, debt and interest payments) and its internal 
obligations (for example, salaries and pensions). On April of 2011, after Greece 
and Ireland, Portugal asked European Commission for a bailout subsequent to the 
Government being forced to pay unsustainable interest rates on the market to 
issue debt. At the end of 2010 the Portuguese debt surpassed the 7% interest 
barrier that was established by the Finance Minister as the limit to ask for the 
European financial aid. Thus, with the purpose of receiving financial aid, the 
country is now committed with the European Union to achieve its convergence 
criteria by correcting the balance of payments and consequently restoring its 
capacity of issuing debt in the market at reasonable rates. As a result it has 
announced a set of measures that started to be implemented in 2012. With the 
purpose of reducing the deficit to 5%, in 2012, the Government has imposed a set 
of heavy measures that were not well accepted by the Portuguese population. On 
the expenditure side: cut on worker’s wage and pensions, cut on expenses of the 
health sector, cut on number of public employees; on the revenue side: increase 
on direct taxes, reduction of deductions and exemptions, revaluation of all real 
estate. As a consequence, unemployment rate increased (see figure 3.3). The 
country is now committed in enhancing its growth capacity so that it can become 
more competitive while reducing its excess public debt. Although Portugal is 
currently fulfilling the targets, the economy has fallen more than expected. This 
decline was driven by a noticeable contraction of domestic demand as well as the 
deceleration of exports. The high unemployment rate and its impact in the 
disposable income, is one of the main reason behind the tough economic 
situation. 
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Macroeconomic conditions of recent years have conditioned the retail sector in 
the country, as shows the figure 3.4: 
 
FIGURE 3.3 – UNEMPLOYMENT             FIGURE 3.4 – RETAIL AND FOOD                
 2006-2017                             RETAIL SALES  
 
 
 
3.3  The retail industry 
The general retail industry includes hypermarkets, supermarkets, self-services, 
grocery store, specialized products stores and finally the traditional market. More 
specifically, the food retail tends to highly impact the inflation levels of an 
economy, mainly because there is a significant percentage of the CPI that is 
composed by food products. Traditionally, the retail sector benefit from huge 
liquidity, since it receives much earlier from consumers than it pays to suppliers. 
Given that the sector generally detains high cash inflows, we can understand why 
the sector is characterized by such relevant investment opportunities of 
aggressive expansion processes, internalizations, M&A operations and 
diversification to other areas. Another important trend common on the whole 
retail sector is that it registers higher sales volumes in December, since it refers 
to the Christmas time and it is also when people receive an additional 
remuneration. Following December, we will find November and August. The 
opposite tendency registers January and February as the months with lower 
volumes of sales, with an emphasis to the substitution effect of branded products 
to private label ones, as it will be seen in the next paragraph. So retail market is 
Source – IMF World  Economic Outlook Source - Eurostat 
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seasonal activity, selling progressively more from quarter to quarter.  It is also 
important to clarify that in the retail sector it is generally more complex to 
replicate business models to different countries, contrary to what happens in the 
industry sector. For example the not so successful operations of Lidl or Tesco in 
Poland, which simply replicate their models there, or in Portugal the failure of 
the foreign retailers Carrefour and Tengelmann, that sold their operations for 
Portuguese retailers, the ones which are more conscious of the tendencies in the 
sector. However, retailing is usually the sector that generate higher sales volumes 
and employment in any economy. The profitability of the sector depends on the 
population growth and consumer preferences. The introduction of new retail 
formats, supermarkets and hypermarkets, changed the way retailing is done and 
creating the scale advantage for retailers at the expense of manufacturers. The 
increasing lack of differentiation between retailers made price the main 
competitive factor. As a result, retailers put an effort on obtaining high sales 
volume and operational efficiency to enhance profitability. Therefore, retailers 
use M&A as a way to enlarge their operating capability and to expand to foreign 
markets. Over the last years, the European ongoing crisis has been changing 
customers’ behavior. Customers have adjusted their priorities, becoming more 
value conscious, price sensitive and rational in their purchases. 
Another important change in consumer behavior has been the frequency of 
shopping. Previously, consumers regularly shopped for a whole month, in larger 
formats and further away from the city center. Smaller, closer formats, were used 
to buy more sporadically, where the price was not so important and higher. 
However, in the last decade this trend has undergone profound changes. Due to 
budgetary difficulties experienced by families in recent years, shopping for a 
month gave place to shopping on a weekly basis, and in several cases, daily 
basis. Thus, the average tickets generally decreased by increasing the number of 
visits to the store. On the other hand both large and small formats have had to 
adapt to this new reality.   
The consumers’ focus on price and their higher level of information created 
another trend in retailing: private labels. 
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3.3.1  Private labels’ phenomenon  
A private label (PL) product is a product that is sold under the retailer brand. By 
other words, a retailer may sell products with its brand or develop a new brand. 
Traditionally in both cases the products are sold inside the retailer’s own stores, 
however that may not always be exclusive. Since 1970’s, the Private Label 
market has been suffering a vast transformation process. PLs that were 
previously perceived by customers as cheap, of inconsistent quality and brand 
copies, are nowadays competing in quality. PL products are competing with 
Manufacturer Brands in almost every segment of their positioning. Usually, 
customers acquiring these products reveal a high degree of satisfaction and only 
3% presented some kind of complaint. According to Ailawadi and Keller (2004) 
the PL consumer is a price sensitive customer with a mid-level income and 
usually educated. Although it is a price sensitive customer, it is not image 
sensitive. Therefore, and because price sensitiveness is the only factor that 
attracts customers to buy PL products, some authors clustered the PL offering by 
today’s retailer into three segments: Economy PLs, Standard PLs and Premium  
PLs. They argue that in the Premium category, PLs are very often perceived to 
have as much quality as the direct Management Brand competitors and still being 
sold at a slightly lower price. PLs are growing faster than Management Brand 
products, representing currently a European  market share of 35% (Europe is the 
region with the highest share of PLs). Apparently, this growing tendency is 
highly correlated with the growing presence of hard discounters and also the high 
level of retailer concentration measured by the sum of the 5 top retailers’ market 
share. All the 5 most developed countries regarding PLs have a retailer 
concentration of over 60%. Switzerland is the first ranked with 46% PLs’ share 
and a concentration of 69%. The prevailing reasons behind this effect are the 
retailers’ aims for higher market shares, being able to create brand awareness 
which guarantees consumers’ loyalty. Price plays an important role at the 
moment of decision, which contributes to increase PLs’ sales against 
Management Brands’ sales. In Portugal the average price differential between 
PLs and MBs is around -42%. In this sense, the PL market seems to be resistant 
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to economic fluctuations since they maintained a steady and growing business 
throughout economic increases or decreases. The PL value driver is the wide 
range of categories that this sector manages to offer. However, 35% of European 
consumers agreed that PLs are not suitable for products where quality really 
matters. Consumers may easily adopt PLs when it comes to dog food, 
refrigerated food, or home cleaning products among others , but when it comes to 
personal care, baby food, cosmetics and alcoholic beverages they are less 
convinced about their quality. 
 
3.4  Portuguese retail industry 
The Portuguese grocery retail market is considered to be very mature, and highly 
concentrated, with 6 large groups (Sonae, Jeronimo Martins, Intermarchè, Lidl, 
Minipreco, Auchan)  accounting approximately 80% of total market share (see 
figure 3.5). 
FIGURE 3.5 – TOP 6 PORTUGUESE FOOD RETAILERS’ MARKET SHARES  
 
 
 
 
The Portuguese retail industry reached €19,886 Million in 2012, a decrease of 
0.45% when compared with the previous year (see figure 3.6). Nevertheless, the 
recent performance of this sector has been better than the overall economy. The 
growth of this industry has been achieved through the performance of  
Source – Homescan Nielsen and Analyst’s estimates 
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Modern Retail, while Traditional Retail 
has been declining in the last years. In 
fact, Traditional Retail only account 
more or less 20% of the market, with the 
other 80% deriving from the modern 
distribution retail. In term of market 
structure, the formats dominating in 
Portugal are supermarkets, followed by 
hypermarkets, discounts and others. 
Hypermarkets in Portugal were introduced by Sonae in 1985, but this type of 
markets experienced great development in the following years. In fact in 2004, 
they had 37% of market share, followed by supermarkets. More recently, 
however, supermarkets started to re-gain a dominant position, and if in 2008 they 
had already surpassed hypermarkets, in 2009 and following years, the difference 
accentuated. This  consumer’s shift from hypermarkets to supermarkets is due to 
the trend to avoid visiting shopping centers where usually hypermarkets are 
located. This shift occurred in order to avoid temptation by buying the strict 
minimum, in response to the lower disposable income. The third main channel is 
discount. The most surprising development in the food retail market occurred in 
90’s, when discount chain Lidl entered the Portuguese market. Although in other 
European countries this distribution channel was already implemented, Portugal 
was still quite tied to traditional formats. The success was tremendous, and 
market shares kept increasing year after year. Several reasons were pointed to 
justify that evolution: consumers perceived discount chains to have lower price, 
discount chains increased number of stores in a drastic way, and developed 
private labels. The Portuguese retail market is now dominated by two national 
big players: Sonae and Jeronimo Martins. Both leaders have been reinforcing 
their position, Sonae with Continente department stores acquired Carrefour in 
2007 for €662 million, and Jeronimo Martins with Pingo Doce supermarkets 
purchased Portuguese and Polish Plus stores in 2007/2008 to the Tengelmann 
FIGURE 3.6– GROCERY REATAIL 
SALES (€MN) 
Source – Nova Research 
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group for €320 million. In figure 3.7 we can observe that small retailers are 
losing its weight as the two biggest gain market share.  
FIGURE 3.7 – PORTUGUESE RETAIL MARKET SHARE EVOLUTION 2007-2011 
 
   
In 2007, “Other” chains represented 34% of the market, a value that decreases 
10% until 2011. On the other hand, Intermarchè and Auchan insignia watched its 
market share decreased 1% and 3% for the same period, while Sonae and 
Jeronimo Martins gained 7% and 4%. This is a consequence of the competitive 
advantage that great food distribution chains obtain from the exploitation of 
economies of scale and the increasing understanding of the spending habits of 
consumers. Its greater capacity of performing marketing actions and promotional 
campaigns than smaller retailers increases its bargaining power with suppliers 
and this is reflected in the prices available to consumers. It is expected that both 
leaders keep increasing their market share at the expense of smaller retailers that 
face a higher difficulty in keeping up. As already seen, Sonae holds the 
leadership position, however the gap between its market share and the second 
player Jeronimo Martins has been reduced in recent years, mainly due to two 
reasons. First, Jeronimo Martins has introduced the loyalty card which was Sonae 
MC’ major advance. Second, consumers are valuing convenience and Jeronimo 
Martins, through its Pingo Doce brand, has substantially smaller stores in urban 
centers, unlike MC’s hypermarkets located generally on the periphery and in 
shopping centers. Fighting each other, both retailers are investing significantly in 
solid marketing campaigns in order to increase their brand awareness and attract 
Source - APED 
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more consumers than their competitors. Both Jeronimo Martins and Sonae have 
been largely investing in TV ads. While Jeronimo Martins reinforced its PD’s 
policy for quality at low prices, Sonae promoted its brand Continente.  
Following the global trend, private labels have also been gaining market share in 
Portugal. Despite presenting a low volume when compared to the European 
average, these products have registered a considerable increase in sales. With the  
private brand products, retailers have a higher bargaining power to negotiate with 
the producers. On the consumers’ side, it is also generally agreed that they will 
have access to the same quality products at lower prices. Moreover, it usually 
happens that retailer offer products to the consumers that were produced in the 
same factory as well known brand products, but are commercialized under the 
private brand label. Therefore, JM has its own brand (Pingo Doce) and has been 
watching its share increase for the past few years. Internally, it has limiting the 
number of brands. Around 2000 the group offered 7 or 8 products per category. 
Currently offers 1 to 3 brands with one of those being its private label and the 
other being the market leader brand. The purpose is to increase visibility and 
brand loyalty. While Sonae implemented its first private label products in 1991, 
in both Continente and Modelo, and nowadays the brand Continente is 
recognized in the market.    
Ultimately, the food retail industry might become even more concentrated in 
favor of the two top competitors in detriment of the remaining players. The 
reason for this is the inability to compete with the two major retailers due to they 
higher brand awareness, loyalty established with the Portuguese consumers and 
the superior quality items (at a lower price) of the private labels of both Jeronimo 
Martins and Sonae MC.   
 
3.5  Jeronimo Martins 
  3.5.1 Company overview 
Jeronimo Martins is a Portuguese Group of international stature, which operates 
in three areas: food distribution, industry and services sectors. JM operates in two 
main geographies: Portugal and Poland, additionally the Group started its 
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operations in Colombia in the first quarter of 2013. With its Pingo Doce 
(supermarkets) and Recheio (Cash&Carry) insignias operates in retail and 
wholesale formats. In 1997 expanded to Poland after buying the supermarkets 
brand Biedronka, which is now one of the strongest food retail chains in the 
country operating under the hard discount format. The Polish brand is leader in 
the segment having a clear advantage over its competitors both in number of 
stores and brand recognition. JM began operating in Colombia in March 2013 
through the Ara neighbourhood stores. In the industry sector, JM has a 
significant presence in Portugal being leader in various markets for fast moving 
consumer goods, through its holding shares in Uniliver Jeronimo Martins and 
Gallo Worldwide whose brands are leader in oil, margarine, ice creams and 
detergents markets. The Group’s portfolio also includes a business area related to 
marketing services, representations and restoration that includes Jeronimo 
Martins Distribucao de Produtos de Consumo Lda (Distribution of consumer 
products, representing international brands in food and cosmetic segment), 
specialized retail chain Hussel (trade and manufacture of Chocolate), and 
Jeronimo Martins Restauracao and Servicos ( Restaurants and services, 
Jeronymo Cafè, Chili’s restaurant and ice cream brands: Olà and Ben&Jerry)14.  
 
3.5.2  Business units description 
Food distribution: Pingo Doce, Recheio, Biedronka, Ara   
Created in 1980 Pingo Doce is the largest supermarket chain in Portugal with 376 
stores in the country14. In the grocery retail market, PD is the main player in the 
market, followed by hypermarkets Continente from Sonae group. The expansion 
of this network stores has been through several acquisitions during the last 
decades, as the 75 Plus stores acquired in 2007 are a good example. After a 
successful strategic repositioning in the beginning of the last decade, PD has 
implemented an every day low prices strategy and focus its offer in fresh 
products, in its private brand products and in meal solutions (PD has more than 
200 stores offering take-away services and also restaurants) using its store 
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network at near locations to attract consumers. Since 2010, the Group no longer 
owns Feira Nova being all of those stores converted into Pingo Doce ones.  
Recently, as a response to the much more difficult macroeconomic environment 
and consumer price sensitivity and contrarily to every day low prices strategy, 
Pingo Doce started a strong promotional activity with different campaigns 
aiming to strengthen its competitive positions and price strategy. After the one 
day promotion in May 2012, where consumers benefited from 50% discount in 
ticket sales higher than 100€, the company started campaigns in several food 
products and launched in 2013 a promotional card called “Poupa Mais” (save 
more), in partnership with the oil company British Petroleum, which provides 
discounts in fuel to consumers to be used in British Petroleum stations.  
 
The Cash&Carry chain Recheio is the operator in Portugal with the most 
extensive national coverage and is also leader in the wholesale segment, with 41 
stores in the country
15
. The company focuses mostly on perishables and its 
private brands products as its main strategic priorities. Being an important 
supplier of clients from the HoReCa (Hotels, Restaurants, Café) and traditional 
retail channels, Recheio aims to create long, stable relationships with its clients 
and in February 2011, the company launched the “Amanhecer Stores” project, 
aiming to strengthen these relations with customers as well as to contribute to the 
sustainability of its long term sales. 
 
The business unit in the food distribution segment which has been the most 
valuable source of growth is the Polish hard-discount format Biedronka, which 
presents the biggest retail chain in Poland with a network of 2393 stores. 
Biedronka is leader in hard-discount format as well as in the whole grocery retail 
market in Poland15. Acquired by the Group in 1997, Biedronka has gained 
general popularity in Poland and today is one of the most valuable brands in the 
country, being recognized by 98% of Polish consumers, of which 63% assume to 
be regular buyers and 38% identify the chain as their main store. Private label, 
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accounting for around 55% of Biedronka total sales in 2012, and Perishables are 
the main strategic pillars of the company, which is also making an effort to 
increase non food categories, as a way of attracting consumers. 
 
 
Finally in the food distribution segment, Jeronimo Martins started operations in 
Colombia in March 2013, with its new chain Ara. This new chain, according to 
the information provided by JM, should be similar to the model followed in 
Biedronka, operating discount stores, with an assortment focused mainly in 
Private label and perishables. The group has 36 stores
16
. 
 
Industry: Unilever Jeronimo Martins, Gallo Worldwide 
With the opening of Firma factory, in 1944, the Group began its operations in the 
industry sector, the key moment in the Group’s expansion in this activity 
occurred in 1949, when it established a joint-venture with the multinational 
Unilever. The partnership with Unilever was reinforced in 2007 and it led to the 
creation of the actual business unit of the Group dedicated to the manufacturing 
segment, Unilever Jeronimo Martins. This business unit produces and distributes 
goods in the food, beverages, personal-care and home-care segments, being 
leader in markets such as margarines, iced tea, ice creams and detergents. In 
2009, with the spin-off  of the Olive Oil business of Unilever Jeronimo Martins, 
Gallo Worldwide was created, which is the third largest international Olive Oil 
brand in the world. It is present in all five continents and in more than 47 
countries and it is market leader in Portugal, Brazil, Venezuela and Angola16. 
 
Services: JMDPC, JMRS, Hussel 
In the services sector, Jeronimo Martins distributes and has the exclusive 
representation of several international brands, as well as it develops specialized 
projects in the restaurant industry. The services business includes Jeronimo 
Martins Distribucao de Produtos de Consumo, the Jeronimo Martins Restauracao 
e Servicos and Hussel. JMDPC is the business unit which represents, distributes 
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and sells various international brands in Portugal such as Kellogg’s, Pringles 
among others. JMRS is involved in the development and operation of coffee 
shops, restaurants and ice-creams Kiosks. Finally, Jeronimo Martins owns the 
specialized retail chain Hussel, specialized in chocolates and other candies, 
arising from a Joint-venture between Jeronimo Martins Group and the German 
company Douglas AG. Hussel has 25 stores placed mainly in the shopping 
centers throughout the country
17
.  
 
3.5.3  Group overview 
Regarding the structure of Jeronimo Martins, there are some business units which 
are operated through partnerships with other companies (see figure 3.8). 
Beginning with Pingo Doce, JM owns a 51% stake in this Business unit, while 
the remaining 49% belong to Ahold since 1992, the Dutch retailing group with 
operations in Europe and United States. The other business units in the food 
retail segment, Biedronka and Recheio, are fully owned by JM. Regarding the 
manufacturing sector, the Group holds a 45% stake in both Unilever Jeronimo 
Martins and Gallo Worldwide. The services business units (JMDPC and JMRS) 
are fully owned by JM, while it shares Hussel, controlling 51% of it
18
.  
 
FIGURE 3.8 – GROUP OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
3.5.4  Ownership structu 
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3.5.4  Ownership structure 
The main shareholder of the Group, “Sociedade Francisco Manuel dos Santos”, 
holds 56.1% and it is controlled by 
JM’s Chairman of the Board of 
Director, Alexandre Soares dos 
Santos, and his family. Secondly, 
with 5% of the total capital, there 
is Asteck, which is followed by 
Carmignac Gestion, which holds 
2.7%of JM. BNP Paribas and 
BlackRock are the last qualified 
shareholders, holding 2.2% and 
2%. The remaining 32% are free-
floating shares (see figure 3.9). 
 
 
3.6  Sonae 
  3.6.1 Company overview 
Sonae SGPS is a Portuguese Group that initially started in 1959 as an 
engineering wood business. Nowadays, the firm operates six distinctive business 
units which the company distinguishes between core business, comprising Sonae 
MC (Modelo Continente) and Sonae SR (Specialized Retail), core partnerships 
which are Sonaecom and Sonae Sierra, related businesses Sonae Retail Properties 
(RP), and active investments which is represented by the unit Sonae Investment 
Management
19
. The company’s main focus and value is the retail segment, which 
is comprised of food retail and specialized retail, together making up the 
company’s core business. Sonae also operates in the shopping centre and 
telecommunication sector, with controlling stakes in its two core partnerships: 
Sonae Sierra and Sonaecom. Sonae’s strategy today is to focus in the retail 
segment, by consolidating its leadership position in the Portuguese market, as 
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FIGURE 3.9 – OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Source – Company Data 
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well as continuing the internalization of its operations. Despite internalization 
efforts, the business is still dependent on Portuguese market, representing 90% of 
total revenue.  
 
3.6.2  Business units description 
Food distribution: Sonae MC 
Sonae MC (Modelo Continente) is the main business unit of Sonae SGPS. Its 
current turnover represents approximately 60% of the firm’s total turnover. 
Continente, its hypermarket brand, has been one of the most trusted brands by 
Portuguese consumers for 11 years now in its food retail category. Since the 
launch of its first hypermarket in 1985, Sonae has been able to open numerous 
other in strategic locations: mainly locations with large population density or 
incorporated in large shopping centres, which are usually managed by the 
company itself. The supermarket brands are Modelo and Bom dia, which have 
been rebranded as Continente. This was a well thought strategic move from 
Sonae MC as its main objective was to leverage Continente’s position as one of 
the most trusted brands in Portugal. These supermarkets are typically located in 
small shopping centres or medium sized population centres. The concept is 
associated with convenience and mainly targets the needs of daily shoppers. The 
other formats in this division include Bom Bocado (cafeterias and restaurants), 
Well’s (para-pharmacies), Book.it (bookstores) and Meu Super (franchised local 
food retail stores)
20
.  
 
Specialized distribution: Sonae SR 
Sonae Specialized Retail (SR) is the second largest business unit of Sonae SGPS. 
Its focus is on non food retail segment with a number of different categories of 
products invested in. Currently, it operates several own brands such as: Worten, 
the leading consumer electronics store in Portugal, Worten Mobile, which 
specializes on mobile telecommunications equipment, Sportzone, also a leading 
chain in the Portuguese sports clothing and equipment market, and Modalfa, 
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Zippy and Loop, operating in the clothing, kids apparel and footwear markets. 
This business unit is currently following two distinct principles as guidance for 
its value creation: international expansion and market leadership consolidation in 
Portugal. It is divided between its national and international operations. Sonae 
SR’s internalization focus is Spain, through Worten, Sportzone and Zippy. 
However, in recent years, the internationalization of Sonae SR has slowed due to 
the macroeconomic reality lived in Spain and the less available capital.  
 
Shopping centres: Sonae Sierra 
Sonae Sierra is an international shopping centres specialist, this company is 
responsible for the ownership, development and management of shopping centres 
throughout the world. Sonae Sierra is a 50:50 Joint Venture partnership between 
Sonae SGPS and British company Grosvenor
21
. Recognized like no other, Sierra 
has already collected several international awards distinguishing its innovative 
capacity to develop shopping centres but also to well manage them. It currently 
owns 49 shopping centres mostly in Portugal but also in Brazil, Spain, Italy, 
Germany, Greece and Romania. The company has always maintained a solid 
internalization strategy by never investing in a new real estate project on its own. 
Instead, the company opted to form partnerships with local firms to acquire 
market knowledge and mitigate the risks associated with a highly capital 
intensive industry and the lack of local market knowledge when dealing with 
internationalization strategies. The company’s recent focus has been one of 
capital recycling, by selling stakes in existing investments to finance others in 
emerging markets, mainly in Brazil.  
 
Telecommunication business: Sonaecom 
Sonaecom is Sonae’s telecommunication business unit, it has three distinct 
business areas which are the mobile segment (through the Optimus brand 
representing the 88% of total turnover), the software and information system and 
the Online and Media business unit. The firm is owned by Sonae SGPS with a 
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53.92% with the second highest shareholder being France Telecom with 20%. 
Optimus is the main brand and it offers the four main products of telecoms: 
mobile, fixed, television and internet. However its main focus is on the mobile 
segment being the third player in the Portuguese market.  
 
Retail properties: Sonae RP 
Sonae RP is a business unit with the focus on managing and developing the real 
estate infrastructure associated with Sonae’s retail business units22. Its main 
revenue sources are rents from Sonae MC and Sonae SR, allowed the latter two 
to focus to their core retail business. Currently Sonae RP has under its portfolio 
22 Continente hypermarkets and 96 Modelo Continente supermarkets among 
others. Another objective of this business unit is to conduct sales and leaseback 
operations in order to withdraw assets from Sonae’s balance sheet and, with it, a 
considerable amount of debt. In this regard, this business unit focuses on one of 
the strategic pillars of the holding company which is to deleverage its balance 
sheet. This procedure also allows the firm to release invested capital to further 
investments. 
 
Investment Management   
The Investment Management unit is responsible for supporting the 
implementation of corporate and business strategies. It aims to support Sonae 
SGPS in Mergers, Acquisitions and Restructuring operations in order to 
maximize shareholders value. This business unit has in its portfolio MaxMat 
stores, MDS insurance agency and travel agency GeoStar.        
 
3.6.3  Group overview 
Regarding the structure of Sonae SGPS (see figure 3.10) there are some business 
fully owned by Sonae: Sonae MC, Sonae SR, Sonae RP, Investment 
Management. While other business units are operated through partnerships with 
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other companies: Sonae Sierra (50:50 Joint Venture with Grosvenor) and 
Sonaecom (54% stake)
23
. 
 
 
 
 
   
3.6.4  Ownership structure  
Sonae SGPS is a family owned company, it is considered to have a very stable 
ownership structure. The 
company main shareholder 
with a 52.7% stake is Efanor 
Investimentos, a company 
fully controlled by Belmiro 
De Azevedo, Sonae chairman 
and key figure associated 
with the company’s growth 
and success over the years. 
Others relevant shareholders include BPI, a Portuguese bank owing 8,9% of the 
firm and Bestinver which owns 7.7% (see figure 3.11). 
 Remaining shareholders account for approximately 26.3% of total shares. 
Sonae’s current chairman is Belmiro De Azevedo and the current CEO is Paulo 
De Azevedo.   
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3.7  Descriptive analysis of company data 
In this part of the work a descriptive analysis of company data from a historical 
viewpoint will be presented, in this regard a time series of  data from 1998 to 
2013 has been built for each company. Thus, analyzing operating and financial 
trends of companies in the last 16 years relevant information on the overall 
performance of the companies may be obtained, moreover it might be interesting 
make a comparative analysis of the two leaders of the retail sector. The following 
data refer to the financial statements of Sonae and Jeronimo Martins, from 1998 
to 2013. 
 
3.7.1  Jeronimo Martins 
The table 3.1 summarizes the main economic parameters of Jeronimo Martins  
chosen for the analysis, particularly it contains: sales and services rendered, 
EBITDA, EBIT, net income, total assets, ROE, ROS, ROA. In the last row of the 
table the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) was calculated for each value. 
It may be easily observed that Jeronimo Martins increased its sales at a CAGR of 
9.6%. During these 16 years sales grew almost every year. Also regarding EBIT 
and net income the CAGR registered a positive variation of 9.4% and 10.8% 
respectively. Both EBIT and net income raise over the years, with exception of 
the years 2000-2001 for the EBIT and 1999-2002 for the net income when the 
company registered heavy losses. 
Losses of those years have had a negative impact on ROE (Return on Equity) and 
on ROA (Return on Assets), which nevertheless present a good performance with 
a positive CAGR. While ROS (Return on Sales) is quite stable during the years, 
with a CAGR of 0.4%. The trend of those indicators above-mentioned is 
presented in Figure 3.12.  
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TABLE 3.1 – JERONIMO MARTINS DATA (€ Million)  
 Sales EBITDA EBIT Net 
income 
Total assets ROE ROS ROA 
1998 2,991 257  84 2,243 17.10%  3.74% 
1999 3,280 263 138 73 2,706 14.22% 4.21% 2.70% 
2000 3,915 235 81 -59 3,021 -15.14% 2.07% -1.95% 
2001 4,200 260 85 -73 2,724 -26.11% 2.02% -2.68% 
2002 3,861 264 115 -184 2,235 -66.84% 2.98% -8.23% 
2003 3,417 290 165 82 2,118 29.10% 4.83% 3.87% 
2004 3,495 305 208 131 2,234 23.01% 5.95% 5.86% 
2005 3,828 308 209 146 2,373 21.77% 5.46% 6.15% 
2006 4,407 319 212 151 2,605 19.68% 4.81% 5.80% 
2007 5,350 351 225 151 3,127 17.47% 4.21% 4.83% 
2008 6,894 459 302 176 3,726 18.90% 4.38% 4.72% 
2009 7,317 505 337 223 3,824 20.92% 4.61% 5.83% 
2010 8,691 634 434 300 4,159 26.51% 4.99% 7.21% 
2011 9,838 722 512 357 4,481 25.11% 5.20% 7.97% 
2012 10,876 765 540 366 4,893 24.37% 4.97% 7.48% 
2013 11,829 777 528 393 5,099 23.83% 4.46% 7.71% 
CAGR 9.6% 7.7% 9.4% 10.8% 5.6% 2.2% 0.4% 4.9% 
Source – Own elaboration, values from consolidated annual reports of Jeronimo Martins (1998-2013) 
 
FIGURE 3.12 – TREND OF FINANCIAL INDICATORS OF JM (1998-2013) 
 
Source – Own elaboration, values from consolidated annual reports of Jeronimo Martins (1998-2013) 
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It is also clear from this graphic as the ROE has a turnaround between 1999 and 
2002 due to the losses of this period. These years are the subsequent from the 
expansion of Jeronimo Martins to Poland, in fact because of the lack of 
knowledge about the Polish market and the increase of the competition, things 
gradually started to become more difficult. For this reason the company started a 
restructuring in order to alienate the non-profitable areas and to obtain some 
needed funds, mainly to allow it to concentrate on its core areas
24
. 
While the next graphic (Figure 3.13) shows the trend of the main balance sheet 
items of Jeronimo Martins in the same period. 
 
FIGURE 3.13 – TREND OF BALANCE SHEET ITEMS OF JM (1998-2013) 
 
Source – Own elaboration, values from consolidated annual reports of Jeronimo Martins (1998-2013) 
 
It might be interesting to considerer also some non monetary quantitative 
parameters, such as number of stores (Figure 3.14), number of acquisition and 
number of partnerships (Figure 3.15). The graphic below exhibits the evolution 
of the number of store of Jeronimo Martins between 1998 and 2013. 
During these years there was an increase of stores, especially after 2008, during 
this period Biedronka opened 421 stores and Pingo Doce 89 stores
25
. 
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FIGURE 3.14 – NUMBER OF STORES OF JM (1998-2013) 
 
Source – Own elaboration, values from consolidated annual reports of Jeronimo Martins (1998-2013) 
 
FIGURE 3.15 – NUMBER OF ACQUISITIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS OF JM 
 
Source – Own elaboration, values from consolidated annual reports of Jeronimo Martins (1998-2013) 
Jeronimo Martins concluded acquisitions and partnerships during its history, 
however acquisitions were also a vehicle for diversification and expansion of the 
group. Among these, when JM decided to expanse its operations to Poland, the 
acquisition of the Polish Cash and Carry network Eurocash in 1995 and 
especially the acquisition of Biedronka in 1997, or again the acquisition of 
Vidago Melaco and Pedras Salgadas (VMPS) for the expansion into new area of 
business in manufacturing and services in 1996 (after sold during the 
restructuring period in 2001), or still the acquisition of Plus chain in 2008 in 
order to strengthen in Portugal and in Poland. 
 
3.7.2  Sonae 
With reference to Sonae Group the same table with the same economic 
parameters chosen for Jeronimo Martins (Sales and service rendered, EBITDA, 
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EBIT, net income, total assets, ROE, ROS, ROA) and the CAGR for each value  
may be represented. In this way it will be possible to make a comparative 
analysis between the two companies. Observing the Table 3.2 it is possible to 
note that all the values are subject to increases and decreases every year and 
everyone has a positive CAGR. Net income present the highest CAGR (12.33%) 
and the trend is very valuable, the only losses are registered in 2002 and they 
affect the ROE and ROA of the same year (-10.33% and -0.70% respectively).  
 
 
 
The Figure 3.16 shows the trend of ROE, ROA and ROS. It can be seen better 
how ROE decreases in 2002 and then increases rapidly to reach the maximum 
 Sales EBITDA EBIT Net 
income 
Total 
assets 
ROE ROS ROA 
1998 
2,501 209 129 71 2,278 15.56% 5.16% 3.12% 
1999 
4,319 359 148 67 5,917 5.60% 3.43% 1.13% 
2000 
5,751 546,3 203,6 255,7 7,874 14.20% 3.54% 3.25% 
2001 
6,386 604,2 226,5 55 8,281 5.90% 3.55% 0.66% 
2002 
6,276 649,1 218,8 -56 7,968 -10.33% 3.49% -0.70% 
2003 
6,260 637 203,2 114,5 7,675 19.65% 3.25% 1.49% 
2004 
6,634 778,7 355,1 192,1 7,555 28.16% 5.35% 2.54% 
2005 
6,392 947,8 618,1 648 6,307 42.20% 9.67% 10.27% 
2006 
4,383 599,1 357,2 338,7 6,321 19.98% 8.15% 5.36% 
2007 
4,627 705,5 456,5 356 7,026 21.93% 9.86% 5.06% 
2008 
5,353 620 332 39 7,306 2.49% 6.20% 0.53% 
2009 
5,665 667 349 74 7,552 4.35% 6.16% 0.98% 
2010 
5,845 729 409 199 7,552 10.69% 7.00% 2.64% 
2011 
5,738 671 322 139 7,741 7.07% 5.61% 1.79% 
2012 
5,379 600 232 72 6,035 4.32% 4.31% 4.32% 
2013 
4,821 475 286 464 5,476 24.31% 5.93% 8.47% 
CAGR 4.47% 5.62% 5.45% 12.33% 6.02% 3.01% 0.93% 6.88% 
TABLE 3.1 – SONAE DATA (€ Million)  
 
Source – Own elaboration, values from consolidated annual reports of Sonae (1998-2013) 
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peak in 2005, when net income are very consistent. While ROS is quite steady, 
with some variation of EBIT and Sales which influence the trend.   
 
FIGURE 3.16 – TREND OF FINANCIAL INDICATORS OF SONAE (1998-2013) 
 
 
The Figure 3.17 summarizes the trends of the main balance sheet items of Sonae 
between 1998 and 2013. 
FIGURE 3.17 – TREND OF BALANCE SHEET ITEMS OF SONAE (1998-2013) 
 
 
 
With reference to the non monetary quantitative parameters, it may be 
represented the number of stores, number of acquisitions and partnerships for 
Sonae as well (Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.19). 
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Source – Own elaboration, values from consolidated annual reports of Sonae (1998-2013) 
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FIGURE 3.18 – NUMBER OF STORES OF SONAE (1998-2013) 
 
 
The number of stores of Sonae rises during the period analyzed, especially after 
2007. The last graphic shows the number of acquisitions and partnerships of 
Sonae. 
FIGURE 3.19 – NUMBER OF ACQUISITIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS OF SONAE 
 
 
Sonae made a number of joint ventures in the past years, mostly to diversify its 
activities. Among these may be mentioned the joint venture with France Telecom 
in 1997 and the resulting entry in the telecommunication sector, or with reference 
to the time series analyzed between the most important acquisitions is that of 
2007 (Carrefour Portugal) to reinforce its position in the Portuguese retail 
market. 
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3.7.3   Comparative analysis 
Both Sonae and Jeronimo Martins have a positive CAGR for each value during 
the same period considered, with net income the highest value of CAGR (10.8% 
JM; 13.3 % Sonae) and ROS the lowest value (0.4% JM ; 0.9 % Sonae). The 
Figure 3.20 offers a comparative reading of all values. 
FIGURE 3.20 – CAGR OF SONAE AND JM (1998-2013) 
 
 
The trends of both companies are positive, particularly Jeronimo Martins 
registers a steady growth after 2002 while trends of Sonae are subjects to more 
variations during this period. Also the developments of the number of stores is 
very similar between the two companies with a steady increase from 1998 to 
2013. Data of Jeronimo Martins are positive influenced by Biedronka (leader in 
Poland) while considering the Portuguese context Sonae MC holds the leadership 
position, but the gap between its market share and Jeronimo Martins has been 
reduced in recent years. However these data reflect the growth and expansion of 
the two companies during the years that has led them to be the two undisputed 
leader of the Portuguese retail sector, which might become even more 
concentrated in favor of the two top competitors. 
 
3.8  Econometric analysis 
In the last part of the work an econometric analysis of time series data of the two 
case studies will be proposed. The aim of the study is to determine whether the 
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number of acquisitions and partnerships concluded by the companies has 
influenced the number of stores that the two companies have opened in the years 
1998-2013. In this regard four econometric models are proposed below. In the 
following econometric models the dependent variable is the number of stores, 
while the key independent variables are the number of acquisitions and the 
number of partnerships. Furthermore also an economic-financial variable or a 
variable of business growth will be added to each model, in order to verify its 
influence to the dependent variable. The companies data used for the analysis 
were obtained from the consolidated annual reports of Jeronimo Martins and 
Sonae of the years 1998-2013. The elaborations were realized using the software 
STATA Version 12. 
 
MODEL 1: 
Dependent variable: Number of stores 
Independent key variables: Number of acquisitions, Number of partnerships 
Independent economic-financial variable: Cash Flow From Operations 
 
 Number of obs = 29 
F (4.24) = 7.02 
Prob > F = 0.0007 (***) 
R-Squared = 0.5428 
Root MSE = 495.09 
N° stores Coef. 
Robust standard 
error 
t P > | t | 
N° acquisitions 114.9769 74.2905 1.55 0.135 
N° partnerships 208.1406 93.08106 2.24 0.035 (*) 
CFFO 2.443187 0.8119055 3.01 0.006 (**) 
Total assets -0.2502345 0.0505828 -4.95 0.000 (***) 
Cons 909.9726 220.4147 4.13 0.000 (***) 
 
 
*** Significance level for p<0.001; ** for p<0.01; * for p<0.05; † for p<0.10. 
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Observing the data of the Model 1, from the table appears that the model is 
statistically significant with a Probability > F=0.0007 which is minor of 
significance level for p < 0.001, and a number of observation of 29, F-Statistic 
(that measures the “goodness” of the model) of 7.02 and a R-Squared of 54.28 % 
which is the coefficient of determination that indicates the information capacity 
of the model. The first column of the table contains the dependent variable 
(number of stores), the independent variables (number of acquisitions and 
number of partnerships), these three variables will be also present in the tables of 
the other three models. Finally the economic-financial variable (Cash Flow From 
Operations) and Total Assets that is a control variable and it suggests us how the 
company size can create differences. According to this model the number of 
acquisitions is not significant, with a p-value of 0.135 major of the all 
significance levels (0.001; 0.01; 0.5; 0.10). Consequently, the companies while 
making acquisitions, they do not influence the number of stores. On the contrary, 
the number of partnerships is statistically significant, having a p-value of 0.035 
that is minor of 0.05, so the more increase the number of partnerships and the 
more increase the number of stores. The Cash Flow From Operating is also 
significant (P-value 0.006 < 0.01) and it presents a positive coefficient (2,44), 
consequently an increase of the CFFO leads to an increase in the number of 
stores. With reference to the Total Assets, it is very significant, in fact p-value is 
0.000 but it has a negative coefficient of -0.25, thus the largest is the size of the 
companies and the lowest is the number of stores that they open.  
Ultimately, a summary of the results derived from the Model 1 is: 
 N° of acquisitions does not influence the number of stores. 
 N° of partnerships influences the number of stores. More partnerships 
may lead to more stores. 
 CFFO influences the number of stores. An increase of CFFO may lead to 
an increase in the number of stores.  
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MODEL 2: 
Dependent variable: Number of stores 
Independent key variables: Number of acquisitions, Number of partnerships 
Independent variable of business growth: EBITDA 
 
Number of obs = 32 
F (4.27) = 10.67 
Prob > F = 0,0000 (***) 
R-Squared = 0.5967 
Root MSE = 474.4 
N° stores Coef. 
Robust standard 
error 
t P > | t | 
N° acquisitions -24.413515 88.89462 -0.27 0.786 
N° partnerships 184.0228 95.88543 1.92 0.066 (†) 
EBITDA 3.117966 1.268824 2.46 0.021 (*) 
Total assets -0.3121728 0.0834056 -3.74 0.001 (***) 
Cons 812.4683 205.6269 3.95 0.001 (***) 
 
 
The Model 2 presents a number of observations of 32 and it is very significant 
with Prob > F=0.000 , it has F-Statistic=10.77 and R-Squared=59.67%. Number 
of acquisitions does not influence the number of stores, in fact it is not significant 
(p-value=0.786 > significance levels). Number of partnerships is significant with 
a p-value of 0.066 and a coefficient of 184.02 , so when the companies conclude 
partnerships they have a positive effect on the number of stores. The variable of 
business growth EBITDA also influences the dependent variable, it has a p-
value=0.021 and a coefficient of 3.117, the higher the EBITDA and the greater 
the number of stores. 
The results of the Model 2 are: 
 N° of acquisitions does not influence the number of stores. 
 N° of partnerships influences the number of stores. More partnerships may 
lead to more stores. 
*** Significance level for p<0.001; ** for p<0.01; * for p<0.05; † for p<0.10. 
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 EBITDA influences the number of stores. An increase of EBITDA may 
lead to an increase in the number of stores. 
 
MODEL 3: 
Dependent variable: Number of stores 
Independent key variables: Number of acquisitions, Number of partnerships 
Independent variable of business growth: Sales 
 
Number of obs = 32 
F (4.27) = 101.31 
Prob > F = 0.0000 (***) 
R-Squared = 0.8571 
Root MSE = 282.35 
N° stores Coef. 
Robust standard 
error 
t P > | t | 
N° acquisitions 38.26932 83.71439 0.46 0.651 
N° partnerships 127.8649 41.40933 3.09 0.005 (**) 
Sales 0.2695334 0.0156629 17.21 0.000 (***) 
Total assets -0.1188879 0.0269052 -6.72 0.000 (***) 
Cons 268.6334 111.6287 2.41 0.023 (*) 
 
 
This is also a significant model because it has Prob > F=0.000 and it provides us 
a (high) capacity information with a percentage of 85.71 (R-Squared). It also 
presents the same number of observations of the previous model (32) and F-
Statistic=101.31. Also the Model 3 gives us similar results as the previous 
models: the number of partnerships influences even in this case the number of 
stores (p-value=0.005 < 0.01). Conversely, the number of acquisitions does not 
have consequences on the number of stores (p-value=0.651 > significance 
levels). The variable of business growth added in this model are the sales: this 
variable are very significant with a p-value of 0.000 , an increase of sales leads to 
*** Significance level for p<0.001; ** for p<0.01; * for p<0.05; † for p<0.10. 
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an increase of the number of stores but with a low coefficient of 0.269 , 
consequently the influence is not very relevant.  
The results of Model 3 are: 
 N° of acquisitions does not influence the number of stores. 
 N° of partnerships influences the number of stores. More partnerships may 
lead to more stores. 
 Sales influence the number of stores. A growth of sales may lead to an 
increase in the number of stores. 
 
MODEL 4: 
Dependent variable: Number of stores 
Independent key variables: Number of acquisitions, Number of partnerships 
Independent variable of business growth: Number of employees  
 
Number of obs = 32 
F (4.27) = 23.47 
Prob > F = 0.0000 (***) 
R-Squared = 0.7140 
Root MSE = 399.51 
N° stores Coef. 
Robust standard 
error 
T P > | t | 
N° acquisitions 12.30736 121.673 0.10 0.920 
N° partnerships 157.7248 54.51505 2.89 0.007 (**) 
N° employees 0.40581 0.0051568 7.87 0.000 (***) 
Total assets -0.1725537 0.0373316 -4.62 0.000 (***) 
Cons -52.10794 207.0985 -0.25 0.803 
 
 
The Model 4 is characterized by high significance with a Prob > F= 0.000 and R-
Squared of 71.41% (high). To the number of acquisitions corresponds a p-value 
of 0.920 (this variable is not significant with a p-value > significance levels). 
Number of partnerships has a p-value of  0.007 (this variable is significant with a 
*** Significance level for p<0.001; ** for p<0.01; * for p<0.05; † for p<0.10. 
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p-value < 0.01). The number of employees has p-value=0.000 and coefficient 
0.040. This variable is significant but it does not have a relevant influence on the 
number of stores due to the low coefficient, however more employees of  the 
companies lead to more stores. 
A summary of the results derived from the Model 4 is: 
 N° of acquisitions does not influence the number of stores. 
 N° of partnerships influences the number of stores. More partnerships 
may lead to more stores. 
 Number of employees influences the number of stores. An increase in the 
number of employees may lead to an increase in the number of stores.  
On the methodological, since the data are collected in the logic of the time series, 
it should be specified that the standard errors are robust and have been estimated 
using the Newey-West (HAC) method, in order to prevent problems of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
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4.  CONCLUSIONS 
The research question of the work is pointed out as follows: has the number of 
acquisitions and partnerships influenced the number of stores that Sonae and 
Jeronimo Martins opened during the years 1998-2013?  
To answer this research question the first part of the thesis was focalized on a 
literature review on diversification strategy in order to better understand the rest 
of the work and to introduce the second chapter about the diversification modes. 
Firms typically enter new markets through internal development, a common 
alternative is to acquire a firm or business unit that is already established, a 
further alternative is to enter through alliances such as joint ventures. This 
theoretical part of the work allowed to identify the main advantages and 
disadvantages of the three main methods of diversification.  
In the third chapter the empirical analysis of the two case studies was made. 
After an identification of the main features of the retail sector and a companies 
overview, a description analysis of company data was proposed. Through this 
analysis it emerged that both companies have good performance and basically 
results in growth during the period analyzed, in fact it resulted that the companies 
have a positive CAGR for all values considered. From this analysis also results 
that despite the companies over the year concluded important acquisitions, for 
diversified their activities and for a business growth, the number of partnerships 
is basically major, mostly in the last years. Increasing the level of analysis, in the 
last part of the work, it was confirmed that the partnerships has played an 
important role for the two companies. An econometric analysis showed that and 
it has been used to answer the research question. In this regard four econometric 
models are proposed. In these econometric models the dependent variable is the 
number of stores, while the key independent variables are the number of 
acquisitions and the number of partnerships. Furthermore also an economic-
financial variable or a variable of business growth (Cash Flow From Operations, 
EBITDA, Sales, Number of employees) will be added to each model, in order to 
verify its influence to the dependent variable. The four models provided very 
interesting results, that are summarized below: 
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 N° of acquisitions does not influence the number of stores. 
 N° of partnerships influences the number of stores. More partnerships may 
led to more stores. 
 CFFO influences the number of stores. An increase of CFFO may lead to 
an increase in the number of stores.  
 EBITDA influences the number of stores. An increase of EBITDA may 
lead to an increase in the number of stores. 
 Sales influence the number of stores. A growth of sales may lead to an 
increase in the number of stores. 
 Number of employees influences the number of stores. An increase in the 
number of employees may lead to an increase in the number of stores.  
It is possible to conclude that whether the company is not very large the 
partnerships are the main vehicle to increase the number of stores but when it 
becomes bigger it does not focus more on the number of stores but probably on 
other aspects not monitored by the model.  
The limits of the study can be attributed to the number of the case analyzed and 
the temporal extension of the time series analyzed. The companies considered are 
definitely the most important in the Portuguese retail sector and two of the most 
important in the Portuguese economic context, however an increase in the case 
studies can improve the analysis. Lastly, despite the satisfactory results achieved, 
in future research we need to increase the number of companies to be analyzed 
and the temporal extension of the time series. Therefore, the analysis showed that 
the partnerships have been very important for the two companies that used them 
not only as a diversification mode but they also played an important role in the 
opening of new stores during the period considered. 
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